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Case No. CV08-2272 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' JAKE AND 
AUDREY SWEET'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFENDANTS' VANCE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, husband and 
wife, by and through their attorney, Theodore 0. Creason of Creason, Moore & Dokken, 
PLLC, and hereby submit this Reply to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Vance's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Please see Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Plaintiffs Verified Complaint to Enjoin Defendants From Obstructing Easement, 
Attached as Exhibits 1 & 2. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The moving 
party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. In opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, however, the non.moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or ... otherwise . 
. . , must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. 
Civ. P. Rule 56(e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. "A mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact." Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 
86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). Further, "[c]reating only a slight doubt as to the facts 
will not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment will be granted 
whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict would be 
warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake River 
Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (1984). To be 
considered by the court, the evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a motion 
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for summary judgment must be admissible. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 
P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). 
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
1. THE HOCHS WERE GRANTED AN EXPRESS EASEMENT FOR 
ACCESS OVER THE UPPER ROAD IN THEIR WARRANTY DEED. 
In their responses to Hochs' motion for summary judgment, the V ances and 
Sweets raise several arguments. Initially, they argue the term "roadway" contained in the 
deeds conveying the parcels to the V ances and Sweets is ambiguous. In addition, they 
make several assertions purporting to establish that genuine issues of material fact exist 
that preclude summary judgment. Specifically, they argue there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to: the existence of the upper road at the time of the conveyances, the 
character of the easement as appurtenant or in gross, what constitutes the dominant estate, 
and whether the Vance and Sweet deeds created two separate easements. For the 
following reasons, the defendants' arguments as to the express easement are 
. 1 
unpersuas1 ve. 
a. The Use of the Term "Roadway" Does not Render the Easement 
Ambiguous and, Therefore, Extrinsic Evidence is Inadmissible. 
The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the Hochs provided the 20 acre parcel 
was being conveyed: 
1 The Hochs concede, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to their claims for an 
easement implied from prior use and by necessity. Although the Hochs still maintain an easement exists on 
those theories, they acknowledge the defendants have raised factual issues that must be decided before the 
Court may render judgment in favor of the Hochs based upon those theories. 
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Subject to and together with the rights and responsibilities set forth in the 
following easements: 
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental 
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as 
Instrument No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the 
Vances] 
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental 
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as 
Instrument No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the 
Sweets] 
(Pls. Verified CompL 4-5.) The referenced deeds to the Sweets and Vances provide: 
Reserving unto the grantor, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress 
and egress running from public right of way to the above described 
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an 
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property 
herein being conveyed. 
Exhibits 3 & 4. The Sweets argue the term roadway as used in the conveyances is 
ambiguous because it "is unclear whether the term . . . would include an unimproved 
route" or was referencing only those roads "actually in use at the time of the execution of 
the deed." (Sweet's Response 8.). 
The Sweets' argument is unconvincing. The deeds do not impose any conditions 
on what constitutes a roadway. Had the deeds been designed to only reserve an easement 
over improved roads or roads currently in use they would have indicated as much. 
Because the deeds do not limit the easement to improved roads or roads currently in use, 
they should not be construed in such a limited manner. The imposition of restrictions on 
an easement by a court is only permissible in regards to the use or scope of an 
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easement. See Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706, 712 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (permitting court to impose restrictions not contained in the easement with 
respect to the purposes for which the easement could be used). Imposing restrictions on 
the scope of an easement is permissible since the dominant estate owner may only use the 
easement in a manner that is consistent with the servient estate owner's enjoyment of the 
property. Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246, 270 P.2d 825, 827 (1954) ('"When the right 
of way is not bounded in the grant, the law bounds it by the line of reasonable 
enjoyment.' This means 'that the easement must be a convenient and suitable way and 
' 
must not umeasonably interfere with the rights of the owner of the servient estate.'" 
(quoting Ingelson v. Olson, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (Minn. 1937))); Backman v. Lawrence, 
147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 
948, 951 (1976). The Sweets have cited no authority that authorizes courts to limit the 
grant of easement itself. As such, the Court should reject the Sweets' attempt negate the 
grant of easement contained in the deeds. 
Moreover, the phrase "all roadways" is not ambiguous and included the upper 
road. Neither defendant has presented a valid argument in support of the proposition that 
the term "roadway" would not include the upper road. Black's Law Dictionary defines a 
"road" as "a strip of land appropriated and used for purposes of travel and 
communication between different places." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). The 
undisputed evidence indicates the upper road satisfies this definition as it was a strip of 
land used for purposes of travel over the 90 acre parcel. Both defendants admit that the 
upper road could be used for purposes of travel at the time they purchased their property. 
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They simply assert that the road was not traversable by car. As discussed above, 
however, that fact is not determinative. Nothing in the reservation of easement limits the 
reservation to roadways in pristine condition, improved roads, paved roads, graveled 
roads, or those traversable by two wheel drive vehicles. Instead, the reservation created 
an access easement for traveling over the Sweets' and Vances' properties. By Sweet's 
own admission, the upper road was capable of being traveled one just had to drive 
"carefully between the trees." (Aff. of Jake Sweet 2.) 
In addition, the Sweets argue that the term "all roadways presently existing on the 
property" is ambiguous because it "does not specify the locations or dimensions of the 
roads." (Sweet Response 7.) The only case the Sweets cite for the proposition that an 
easement is ambiguous unless its dimensions are described with particularity in the 
conveyance is from Wyoming and, thus, is not controlling on this Court. In any event, 
the decision does not stand for the proposition the Sweets rely upon it for. Rather than 
addressing the existence of an easement itself, the decision pertains to ambiguities in an 
easement description. See R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 
(Wyo. 1999). The existence and description of an easement are two separate and distinct 
issues. 81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) (indicating that the extent, scope, or 
dimensions of an easement are issues separate and apart from the existence of the 
easement itself); Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 524, 817 P.2d 188, 190 (Ct. App. 
1991) ("We uphold the Bethels' right to an easement but remand for entry of an amended 
judgment fixing and describing the location of the easement."); see also Quinn, 75 Idaho 
at 246-47, 270 P.2d at 826 ("[W]here a conveyance of a right of way does not definitely 
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fix its location, the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way 
within the limits of the grant."). The lack of a precise description does not establish a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether a road actually existed or whether the Roch's were 
granted an easement. 
At this point, the Hochs are only requesting summary judgment on the issue of the 
existence of the easement itself. They are not seeking a ruling on the precise dimensions 
and location of the road. The Court can later issue a judgment specifying the scope of the 
easement. See Harvvood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 678, 39 P.3d 612, 618 (2001) 
(upholding district court's grant of partial summary judgment on issue of whether an 
express easement existed and subsequent bench trial on the issue of the scope of the 
easement). Accordingly, the Sweets' attempt to utilize the lack of a precise description of 
the dimensions of the easement to challenge the grant of easement itself must fail. 
The V ances also argue that the reservation of an easement over "all roadways 
presently existing" is ambiguous. They contend that the reservation arguably only 
pertained to the lower road since that is the only road specifically mentioned in all of the 
deeds. In making their argument, the Vances rely on Cridlebaugh's deposition testimony 
indicating that he did not intend to grant the Hochs an easement over the upper road. 
The Court should reject the Vances' proffered interpretation of the deeds. 
Although the circumstances surrounding the grant of an easement may sometimes be 
considered in construing the instrument, such evidence may only be relied upon when the 
language of the instrument is ambiguous. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404, 195 
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P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008). Here, the language in the deeds to the Vances and Sweets is not 
ambiguous. Both the Sweet and Vance deeds reserve an easement "across 
all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed." Exhibits 3 & 4. 
By using the plural term "roadways" it is clear the instruments were not intended to 
reserve an easement over a single road. It would be unreasonable to conclude that use of 
the plural "roadways" in the reservations was intended to reserve an easement over a 
single road. The deeds are therefore unambiguous in this regard and extrinsic evidence 
may not be relied upon to contradict their plain language. Cridlebaugh' s deposition 
testimony attempting to directly contradict the terms of the deed is inadrnissible.2 
Nothing about the language in the reservation or grant of easement over the upper 
road is ambiguous. Because the upper road was in existence at the time the parcels were 
subdivided, Cridlebaugh reserved an easement over the road by virtue of the deeds to the 
Sweets and Vances. Cridlebaugh conveyed that easement to the Hochs by referencing 
the easement in their deed. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, in making their various arguments, both parties 
maintain Cridlebaugh's intent and other extrinsic evidence should be considered in 
determining whether the Hochs were granted an easement over the upper road. Although 
the court's primary goal in interpreting a deed of conveyance is to give effect to the 
parties' intent, such intent may be settled as a matter of law based upon the plain 
2 In any event, Cridlebaugh' s deposition testimony indicates he intended to reserve himself an easement 
over the upper road. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 49.) The only question his testimony raised pertained to granting 
such an easement to the Hochs. As discussed below, however, because the easement was appurtenant, it is 
attached to the Hochs' property. 
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language of the document when the language is unambiguous. Porter, 146 Idaho at 404, 
195 P.3d at 1217. The parties' intent only becomes a question of fact when the language 
in the deed is ambiguous. Id. Language will be regarded as ambiguous when it is subject 
to reasonable conflicting interpretations. Id. When language is ambiguous, the trier of 
fact must determine the parties' intent based upon the language of the conveyance and the 
surrounding circumstances. Id.; Bethel, 120 Idaho at 525, 817 P.2d at 191 ("An 
instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous .... 
When an instrument is ambiguous in nature, the intention of the parties as reflected by all 
of the circumstances in existence at the tin1e the easement was given must be considered 
in construing the granting instrument."). 
Because the deeds in this case are unambiguous, extrinsic evidence may not be 
utilized by the Court in determining whether the Hochs obtained an easement over the 
upper road. Although intent may become relevant when the Court is faced with deciding 
the scope and dimensions of the easement since they are not precisely identified in the 
instrument, at this point, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. See R. C.R., Inc., 978 P .2d at 
586. ("If the terms of description are inadequate or nonexistent, then extrinsic evidence 
may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties as to the location and dimensions 
of the easement."). Pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the deeds, the Hochs obtained 
an express easement over all existing roads on the Sweet and Vance properties. This 
necessarily included the µpper road. 
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b. There is No Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to the Existence of 
the Upper Road at the Time the Property was Subdivided. 
Next, the defendants argue that the Hochs did not obtain an easement over the 
upper road because the road was not in existence at the time the 90 acre tract was 
subdivided. Alternatively, they argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the road existed. Under this theory, if the upper road did not exist at the time the 
property was conveyed to them it was not an "existing roadway" over which Cridlebaugh 
retained an easement that he could subsequently grant to the Hochs. 
Contrary to the defendants' assertion, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the existence of the upper road at the time of the conveyances. The evidence 
clearly indicates the upper road existed at the time Cridlebaugh began subdividing the 
property. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 9, 20.) In fact, the road existed before Cridlebaugh even 
purchased the 90 acre tract, although it was admittedly a dirt road. Id. at 19. In reference 
to the upper road, Cridlebaugh admitted in his deposition that: 
It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from, 
well, from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a 
loop before I bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a 
westerly direction in front of V ances, made a loop out toward the 
Hochs' property and then went right back ... out to my ten acres. 
Id. He further indicated that the road was an access road, then went on to testify: 
Q. Okay. At the time you sold the property to both Vance and to 
Sweet, both the upper and the lower roads were in place; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And, and Teats had bladed the, both of those roads, correct? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. And they were passable, certainly by a pickup truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Was it your intention when you first deeded property to Jake 
and Audrey Sweet to retain, for yourself anyway, an easement on both the 
lower and the upper road? 
A. Yes. 
Id. at 20, 48-49. Based upon this testimony, it is clear the upper road existed at the time 
of all three of the conveyances. 
Nonetheless, both defendants attempt to argue the upper road did not exist until 
2004. Their own construction of the facts, however, undermines their assertion. In his 
affidavit in opposition to the Hochs' motion for summary judgment, Jake Sweet admits, 
with respect to the upper road, that "[y]ou could drive a pickup truck carefully between 
the trees on what appeared to be ATV trails that were not connected or skidder trails that 
had been used when the property had been logged." (Aff. of Jake Sweet 2.) Becky 
Vance represents in her affidavit that "it was not possible for a car to access Mr. and 
Mrs. Roch's property by the 'upper road'" prior to 2003 or 2004. (Aff. of Becky Vance 
2, para. 6) (emphasis added). 
Neither the Vances nor the Sweets presented any evidence to indicate the upper 
road did not exist at the time of the conveyances. Their reliance on the fact that the upper 
road was not traversable by car at the time of the conveyances is misplaced. As 
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discussed above, the term "roadway'' is not limited to improved roads traversable by car. 
Both defendants admit (although the Vances' only implicitly) that trucks could utilize the 
road. In addition, the Sweets admit that the upper road was accessible before they began 
improving it. Jake Sweet testified in his affidavit that he and his wife "began 
to improve access across Weinert and Cridlebaugh' s property to our property by 
removing trees and blading a somewhat straight route to our property." (Aff of Jake 
Sweet 2) (emphasis added). One cannot improve something that does not already exist. 
If the road did not exist until 2004 as the Sweets maintain, they would have had to 
construct new access, rather than improve existing access. Further, the Sweets admit that 
Cridlebaugh granted them an easement over the upper road in the deed conveying them 
the 40 acre parcel. See (Sweets' Response 4) ("The Sweet Deed provides in three 
paragraphs the easements at issue here. The first paragraph sets over to Sweet what is 
commonly referred to as the 'upper road.'"). Because the Sweets obtained title to the 
property in 2001 and the upper road was specifically referenced in their deed, it is 
disingenuous for them to argue the road did not exist until 2004. Finally, Cridlebaugh 
clearly testified the road existed at the time he purchased the property. (Cridlebaugh 
Dep. 20, 48-49.) In light of these facts, it is evident that what the defendants' assertion 
essentially comes down to is that the upper road was not in as good of condition at the 
time of the conveyances as it is today. 
Because it is undisputed that the upper road could be utilized, albeit by truck, at 
the time of the conveyances, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its 
existence. Although the road may not have been in the best condition before it was 
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improved by the Sweets, it was in existence at the time the properties were conveyed to 
the V ances, Sweets, and Hochs. Accordingly, the Hochs have an access easement over 
the upper road. The only fact that remains to be determined is the scope of the access 
easement granted to the Hochs - not its existence. 
c. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists With Respect to the 
Appurtenant Nature of the Easement. 
The defendants argue that, even if Cridlebaugh did reserve an easement over the 
upper road, the easement was in gross and, thus, was not transferred to the Hochs by their 
deed. In making this argument, the defendants rely on the fact that their deed specifically 
indicates that the easement for ingress and egress is appurtenant while the reservation of 
an easement over all other existing roadways contains no such reference. 
An appurtenant easement establishes a right to use a certain piece of property (the 
servient estate) for the benefit of another piece of property (the dominant 
estate). Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). The rights 
stemming from an appurtenant easement attach to the dominant estate and cannot be 
separated from the land. Id. Because such easements are fixed to the real property, they 
run with the land and may be claimed by the original easement mvner's successors-in-
interest. Id.; LC. § 55-603; see also Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 
301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) ("One who purchases land expressly subject to an 
easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing 
easement, takes the land subject to the easement." (quoting Checketts v. Thompson, 65 
Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944))). In Idaho, easements are presumed to be 
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appurtenant. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. There is no requirement that 
easements be referred to as such for the presumption to arise. If there were, there would 
be no need for the presumption. The fact that one easement contained in a deed is 
referred to as appurtenant and another is not is insufficient to overcome the 
presumption. See 25 Arn. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 10 (2009) ("An easement 
may be considered appurtenant if it is so in fact, even though not declared to be so in 
deed."). 
Contrary to the defendants' assertion, Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant 
easement over the upper road. Cridlebaugh' s use of the phrase "appurtenant" to describe 
the easements for ingress and egress can best be explained by the fact that those 
easements already existed as appurtenances to the property. The easement over "all 
roadways presently existing," on the other hand, was not yet an appurtenance to the 
property because it was being created by the reservation. As such, it was not referred to 
as an appurtenance in the deeds. 
The appurtenant nature of the easement over the upper road is further 
demonstrated by the language reserving the easement to the "grantor, his heirs and 
assigns." Exhibits 3 & 4. The Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized that use of the 
phrase "heirs and assigns" in a grant or reservation of easement demonstrates that the 
easement is appurtenant. See, e.g., Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 375, 
723 P.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding presumption of appurtenance was not 
overcome where easement was granted to the plaintiff and his "heirs and assigns" 
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because the phrase '"generally comprehends all those who take either immediately or 
remotely from or under the assignor, whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of 
law'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 109 (5th ed. 1979))). In light of these 
considerations, it is clear Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement over the upper 
road. Because the easement is appurtenant, it was not a personal right belonging to 
Cridlebaugh; but instead, remains attached to the dominant estate. As such, by 
purchasing the dominant estate, the Hochs obtained the easement regardless of whether it 
was specifically mentioned in their deed. See 81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) 
("An appurtenant easement for right of way purposes passes with subsequent 
conveyances, even if the specific language of the right of way is not repeated in the 
deed."). 
d. Because the Easement Over the Upper the Road is Appurtenant, it 
Was Not Necessary that it be Specifically Mentioned in the Hochs' 
Deed to be Conveyed. 
The V ances argue that Cridlebaugh reserved two separate easements in his grants 
to the V ances and Sweets: one for ingress and egress and one over all existing roadways. 
According to the V ances, the deed from Cridlebaugh to the Hochs only conveyed the 
easement for ingress and egress, which was over the lower road. The V ances maintain 
the deed to the Hochs did not convey an easement over other existing roadways and, 
therefore, the Hochs do not have an easement over the upper road. 
The V ances' argument is unconvmcmg because the easement Cridlebaugh 
reserved over all existing roadways was an appurtenant easement that cannot be separated 
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from the real property. As discussed above, in Idaho, when the nature of an easement is 
unclear, courts will presume the easement is appurtenant. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 
76 P.3d at 974. Because appurtenant easements are attached to the land, they need not be 
specifically mentioned in a deed to be conveyed with the property. See Bothwell v. 
Keefer, 53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 66 (1933) ("And the general rule is that, where 
an easement is annexed to land, either by grant or prescription, it passes as an 
appurtenance with the conveyance 'of the dominant estate, although not specifically 
mentioned' in the deed, or even without the use of the term 'appurtenances,' 'unless 
expressly reserved from the operation of the grant.'" (quoting Johnson v. Gustafson, 49 
Idaho 376, 288 P. 427, 429 (1930))); Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 
13, 156 P.3d 502, 514 (2007) (noting that a water right passes "with the property to 
which it is appurtenant even though not mentioned in the deed, [based on] analogy from 
the law applicable to easements"). 
Here, there has been no evidence presented to rebut the presumption that the 
easement over the upper road was an easement appurtenant. Instead, for the reasons 
elaborated above, several facts demonstrate the easement Cridlebaugh reserved over all 
existing roadways was appurtenant to the property purchased by the Hochs. Accordingly, 
even if the language of reservation in the Sweet and Vance Deeds is construed to create 
two distinct easements as the V ances suggest, the Hochs still obtained an access easement 
over the upper road when they purchased the property. Because the easement was 
appurtenant, the easement over the upper road was included in the conveyance to the 
Hochs and they are entitled to summary judgment. 
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e. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that the Hochs are the 
Owners of the Dominant Estate. 
Next, the Sweets argue it is unclear whether the Hochs are the owners of the 
dominant estate. They maintain that, because their deed is ambiguous as to what property 
constitutes the dominant estate, the reference in the Hoch Deed to the Sweet Deed 
"perpetuates" the ambiguity. 
The Sweets' argument that it is unclear what property is the dominant estate lacks 
credibility. The easement, being one of reservation, unmistakably and conclusively 
establishes the property retained by the grantor as the dominant estate. Cridlebaugh 
originally owned 90 acres of property. Each deed contained a description of the property 
being conveyed. There was never any question as to the property Cridlebaugh was 
retaining for himself. Consequently, the dominant estate was never in question. 
Accordingly, this theory advanced by the Sweets is not a basis for denying the Hochs' 
motion for summary judgment.3 Cridlebaugh subsequently conveyed the dominant estate 
to the Hochs by Warranty Deed. Exhibit 5. 
3 In any event, this argument by the Sweets is disingenuous since they admit to the existence of a dominant 
and servient estate in their discussion regarding an easement by necessity. See (Sweet's Reply 15) 
("Sweet's offer to provide a route which did not permit Roch's travel in front of Sweet's residence is 
consistent with the servient property owner's ability to use his property consistent with the easement 
granted."). 
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2. THE HOCHS HA VE NOT REQlJESTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED UPON THE THEORY OF A PRESCRIPTNE EASEMENT 
AND DO NOT DISPUTE THE SWEETS' ARGUMENT THAT A 
PRESCRIPTNE EASEMENT DOES NOT EXIST. 
The Hochs do not dispute the Sweets' argument that they do not have an easement 
over the upper road based upon a prescriptive easement theory. The Hochs did not rely 
on that theory in their motion for summary judgment and do not intend to do so now or in 
the future. 
3. THE HOCHS CONCEDE THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE RAISED 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO THEIR 
CLAIMS FOR AN EASEMENT IMPLIED BY NECESSITY AND 
PRIOR USE. 
The Hochs maintain that they are entitled to an easement over the upper road 
based upon the theories of easement implied from prior use and easement by necessity. 
Because the defendants have raised factual issues relevant to the elements necessary to 
prove such easements, however, the Hochs concede they are not entitled to summary 
judgment based upon those theories. In the event the Hochs' motion for summary 
judgment on their express easement theory is denied, however, the Hochs will seek a trial 
on the implied easement theories. At that time, the factual issues of necessity, expense, 
prior use, and prejudice may be determined. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Hochs' motion for summary judgment based on the theory of an express 
easement should be granted. Because the upper road existed at the time of the first grant 
to the V ances in October 2000, the Hochs have an appurtenant access easement over the 
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road. Alternatively, should the Court conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact as 
to the existence of the road at the time of the conveyance to the V ances, the Hochs 
request a grant of partial summary judgment recognizing that, should the trier of fact 
determine the upper road did exist, the Hochs have an easement over the road. Judgment 
would then be entered in favor of the Hochs once the factual issues regarding the 
existence and location of the road were decided. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2009. 
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC 
~£/~~ 
beOd~e 0. Creason 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHNM. HOCH and CAROLED. 
HOCH, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 















Case No. CV08.,2272 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch (hereinafter "the Hochs"), by 
and through their counsel ofrecord, Theodore 0. Creason, of Creason, Moore & Dokken, 
PLLC, hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Jack Cridlebaugh was the o-wner of 90 acres of real property in W aha, Idaho. 
(Cridlebaugh Dep. 6.) In 2000, Cridlebaugh subdivided the property into four parcels. Id. 
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Three of ·the parcels were sold over the course of three years: .Rob and Becky Vance 
purchased 20 acres on October 12, 2000, Jake and Audrey Sweet purchased 40 acres on 
October 10, 2001, .and John and Carole Hoch purchased .20 acres on March 26, 2002. 
Cridlebaugh retained ovmership of the remajning 10 ·acres. (Pls. Verified Comp 1. 3-4.) 
In conveying the three parcels, Cridlebaugh granted and reserved several easements 
over each piece of property. Id. Of particular significance, Cridlebaugh reserved an easement 
over Black Bear Bend, also lmown as the upper road, which was used to access the property 
eventually sold to the Hochs.1 The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the V ances, 
.Instrument No. 657867, stated: 
Reserving unto the grantor, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress running from the public right of way to the above described property. 
which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over 
and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 
Id. at 3 & Exh. A The warranty deed conveying property to the Sweets, Instrument No. 
668025, contained the same provision. Id. at 4 & Exh. B. Thus, pursuant to the warranty 
deeds, Cridlebaugh retained easements over all roads on the 90 acre tract that were in 
existence at the tin1e of conveyance. It is undisputed that the upper road used to access the 
Hochs' property existed at the :time of conveyance. (Cridlebaugh Dep. 20.) 
Wben Cridlebaugh subsequently conveyed the 20 acre parcel to the Hochs, he granted 
them an access easement over the upper road. The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the 
Hochs provided the.20 acre parcel was being conveyed: 
1 The upper road crosses over the northeast portion of the Sweet property and the southwest comer of the 
Vance property. 
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Subject to and together with the rights and responsibilities set forth in the 
follmving easements: 
Easement-for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 200 as Instrument No. 
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [ deedto the V ances] 
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [deed to the Sweets] 
(Pls. V eri:fied Comp 1. 4.:5.) Based on this language in the warranty deed, the Hochs purchased 
the property believing they would be able to access their property by using ·the upper road. 
Although there was a lower road that also led to the Hochs' property, the road was not 
passable during the winter months and, at all other times, it was only accessib1e in a four 
wheel drive vehicle. (CridlebaughDep. 46-47.) 
Immediately after purchasing the property, the Hochs began using the upper road for 
access. In addition, the road was used to deliver construction materials and equipment to the 
property. The Hochs continued to use and maintain the road from 2002 until November 
2007.2 At that point, after five years of using the road, the Hochs received a letter from the 
Sweets indicating that they were terminating the easement over the portion of the upper road 
that traversed their property on June 30, 2008. (See Pls. Verified Compl. Exh. D.) According 
to the Sweets, the Hochs only had a revocable license to use the upper road while their home 
was being constructed. Id. Once construction was completed, the Sweets maintained the 
Hochs would only be permitted to use a newly constructed road, lmown as New Hoch Access, 
to access their property.3 In support of their position, the Sweets argued that Cridlebaugh 
2 The Hochs maintained the road by gravelling it whenever necessary. 
3 The new road went through both Cridlebaugh' s and the Sweets' properties, then connected to the lower 
road and, thus, did not avoid the winter access problems. 
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never :intended to grant ·the Hochs an easement over the upper road. At his deposition, 
however, Cridlebaugh admitted that he retained easements over both the upper and lower 
roads when he conveyed the property to the Hochs. Id. at 9, 19,..20,-48, 50. 
The Hochs responded to the Sweets' letter and informed them that they :intended to 
continue us:ing the upper road for access :in light of their easement over the road. S:ince that 
time, however, the Sweets have blocked the Hochs' access to the road on several occasions. 
(Pls. Verified Compl 5.) The Sweets have used bulldozers, rock berms, and berms of ice to 
restrict the Hochs' access. These actions have deprived the Hochs of access to their property 
during the winter months when the lower road is impassable. 
In an effort to resolve the easement dispute, the Hochs filed a complaint seeking an 
injunction prohibiting the Sweets and V ances from :interfering with their use of the upper road 
easement The V ances :filed a counterclaim asserting a claim for trespass based on the 
presence of certain improvements the Hochs made to what turned out to be the Vances' 
property. The parties engaged in mediation, during which the Vance's trespass claim was 
resolved. The parties were unable to resolve the easement dispute. The Hochs' are now 
seeking summary judgment on their claim to enjo:in the defendants from interfering with the 
Hochs' access easement. 
II. ISSUE 
A Whether the Hochs have an access easement over the upper road. 
III. ARGU1\1ENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
A STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
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the moving-partY is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. _56(c); 
Baxter, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The moving party carries the 
burden of proving the absence ofa genuine issue of material fact. Baxter, 13-5 Idaho at 
170, 16 P.3d at 267. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, the 
nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that -party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or . . . otherwise . . . , must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for .trial." Idaho R. Ci v. P. Rule 5 6( e); 
Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P .3d at 267. "A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to 
create a genuine issue of fact." Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 
(1994). To be considered by the court, the evidence offered in support of or in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 
807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). 
Once the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). "Creating only a 
slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment motion; a summary judgment 
will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the court a directed verdict 
would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as to the facts." Snake 
River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (1984). If the 
' 
adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the 
party. I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
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B. THE HOCHS HAVE AN ACCESS E.ASEMENT OVER THE UPPER 
ROAD BASED ON THE TFIEORIES OF EXPRESS EASEMENT, 
EASEMENT IMPLIBD BY NECCESSITY, AND EASEMENT 
IMPLIBD FROM PRIOR USE. 
An easement is an interest in real property that gives the easement owner "the 
right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the 
general use of the property by the owner." Baclanan v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 
210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976). 
Easements may be created in one of three ways: by express agreement, implication, or 
prescription. Shultz, 97 Idaho at 773, 554 P.2d at 951. Easements exist in two general 
forms: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 
230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). An appurtenant easement establishes a right to use a 
certain piece of property (the servient estate) for the benefit of another piece of property 
(the dominant estate). Id. The rights stemming from an appurtenant easement attach to 
the dominant estate and cannot be separated from the land. Id. Because such easements 
are fixed to the real property, they run with the land and may be claimed by the original 
easement owner's successors-in-interest. Id.; I.C. § 55-603; Akers v. D.L. White Constr., 
Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) ("One who purchases land expressly 
subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or constructive, that it is burdened with an 
existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement." (quoting Checketts v. 
Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944))). An easement in gross, on the 
other hand, exists independent of an interest in land. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d 
at 974. Such easements benefit the easement owner personally and do not attach to a 
particular piece of property. Id. In Idaho, when the nature of an easement is unclear, 
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courts will presume the easement is appurtenant. Id. Here, the Hochs have an 
appurtenant easement over the access road under the rules regarding both express 
easements and easements by implication. 
1. The Warranty Deed Conveying the Property to the Hochs Granted Them 
an express easement over the upper road for purposes of accessing their 
property. 
Express easements may be created by exception or reservation. Akers, 142 Idaho 
at 301, 127 P.3d at204. An easement by reservation occurs when the grantor reserves to 
himself "some new right in the property being conveyed." Id. An easement by exception 
is created when the grantor "withhold[s] title to a portion of the conveyed property." Id. 
Either type of express easement may be created by deed. Lawrence, 143 Idaho at 714, 
152 P.3d at 586. 
Under the statute of frauds, to create an easement by express agreement, there 
must be a writing reflecting the parties' agreement. Shultz, 97 Idaho at 773, 554 P.2d at 
951; Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 541, 681 P.2d 1010, 1016 
(Ct. App. 1984); see also LC. §§ 9-505 & 9-503. "No particular forms or words of art are 
necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear 
their intention to establish a servitude." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 
710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007) (quoting Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 
129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006)). An attempted grant of an easement that fails to comply 
with the writing requirement is unenforceable in courts of law and equity. Weaver, 
106 Idaho at 541, 681 P.2d at 1016. 
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In determining whether an express easement was created, courts seekto carry out 
the intent of the parties. Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-97, 827 P.2d 
706, 709-10 (Ct. App. 1992). When the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, 
the court need not look beyond the four comers of the document to determine the parties' 
intent. Id. at 697, 827 P.2d at 710. Under such circumstances, parol evidence is 
· inadmissible to prove the parties' intent or to contradict the terms of the written 
agreement. Id.; Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007) ("Under 
the parol evidence rule, when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties 
intend to be a final statement of their agreement, evidence of any prior or 
contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the same subject matter 
is not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms of the written contract."); 
McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 111, 190 P.3d 925, 930 (Ct. App. 2008). Only 
when the language of a deed is ambiguous may the parties' intent be determined from 
extrinsic evidence. Firkins, 121 Idaho at 697, 827 P.2d at 710. 
The warranty deed Cridlebaugh granted to the Hochs conveyed an express easement 
over the upper road. In conveying the parcels to the Sweets and V ances, Cridlebaugh clearly 
reserved to himself easements over all roadways existing on the properties. Both deeds 
specifically reserved to the grantor "an easement over and across all roadways presently 
existing on the property herein being conveyed." Cridlebaugh testified that the upper road 
existed on the property when he purchased it in 1999 and remained in existence when the 
property was later conveyed. As such, the upper road was included in the easement 
reservation made in the deeds to the V ances and Sweets. The easement over the upper road is 
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one that runs vvith the land since it was created for the benefit ofCridlebaugh's remailling 
property. Cridlebaugh reserved the easement so he could have access to the remaining 30 
acres of his property - the 10 acres he kept for himself and the 20 acres he subsequently 
conveyed to the Hochs. Because the reserved easement is appurtenant, it was included :in the 
conveyance of the 20 acre parcel to the Hochs. It was not even necessary that the easement be 
specifically mentioned in the Hochs' deed. The fact that the easement was included in the 
deed, however, further supports the conclusion that the Hochs have an easement over the 
upper road. 
The neighbors' position that Cridlebaugh did not convey an ea5ement over the upper 
road to the Hochs is unpersuasive. The Hochs' deed specifically :indicates that, in addition to 
the property being conveyed, Cridlebaugh was conveying an appurtenant "[e ]asement for the 
purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as reserved in [the deeds to the 
Vances and Sweets]." Those deeds reserved easements over all existing roadways, including 
the upper road. As such, the language of the deed makes clear that the Hochs acquired an 
easement over the upper road when they purchased their property from Cridlebaugh. Because 
the language of the deed is unambiguous in this regard, parol evidence may not be used to 
contradict the terms of the conveyance. Any subsequent assertions by Cridlebaugh that he did 
not intend to grant the Hochs an easement over the upper road are therefore irrelevant and 
inadmissible. 
2. In the event the Court concludes the Hochs were not granted an express 
easement the Hochs have an easement· implied by necessity over the 
upper road. 
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Idaho law Tecognizes .two categories of implied easements: easements implied by 
necessity and easements implied from prior use. Baclanan v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 
394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 
P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements are implied by reason of necessity "because 
the parties at the time of severance presumably recognized the need for access" and the 
conveyance of property must include "whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that 
property." MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1118, 739 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App. 
1987). Three elements must be satisfied to "establish an easement by necessity: (1) unity 
of ownership prior to division of a tract; (2) necessity for an easement at the time of 
severance; and (3) great present necessity.''4 Id. Whether an easement by necessity 
exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. Once the three elements are 
satisfied, an easement by necessity will be held to exist, regardless of any contrary intent 
held by one of the parties. Id. at 1119, 739 P.2d at 418. The easement will continue as 
long as the necessity exists unless the easement is terminated by express agreement. Id. 
iill easement by necessity will not be recognized where the benefits of the easement are 
4 This last element has been reformulated to require only reasonable necessity, however, courts still use the 
term "great necessity" in describing the required elements. See Backman, 147 Idaho at 394, 210 P .3d at 79; 
MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1120 n.3, 739 P.2d at 419 n.3. But see Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. 
Han-ison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 P .3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (noting that to establish reasonable necessity in 
the context of easements implied from prior use, a claimant's burden is less than that required to show great 
present necessity in the context of easements implied by necessity). Idaho case law has not seemed to 
recognize or address the contradicting characterizations. The distinction likely lies, however, in whether 
the implied easement will benefit the grantor or the grantee. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851, 
854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("It appears to be the position ofa majority of jurisdictions that an implied grant 
of an easement requires only a showing of reasonable necessity, while an implied reservation of an 
easement in the grantor requires a showing of strict necessity."). Regardless of which standard the court 
chooses to apply, however, for the reasons discussed below, the Hochs have met their burden of proving 
necessity. 
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outlveighed by the damage or inconvenience that may result to the owner of the servient 
estate. Id. at 1120, 739 P.2d at419. 
To satisfy the necessity element of an easement implied by necessity, the plaintiff 
need only show there is a reasonable necessity for the easement. MacCaskill, 112 Idaho 
at 1120 n.3, 739 P.2d at 419 n.3. Reasonable necessity does not require that existing 
routes be "absolutely impossible to use," however, it is not enough to show that the 
existing route is simply inconvenient or expensive. Id. at 1120, 739 P.2d at 419; Weaver, 
106 Idaho at 542, 681 P.2d at 1017. Accordingly, reasonable necessity does not exist 
where access can be made practical at a reasonable expense. MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 
1120, 739 P .2d at 419. Where "the difficulty or expense of using the legally available 
route is so great that it renders the parcel unfit for its reasonably anticipated use," the 
reasonable necessity element will be satisfied. Id. 
Necessity for an easement may exist based on either physical or legal obstacles. 
Id. Thus, "topographical characteristics of the land [that] make the legal access 
impassable" may justify an easement by necessity. Id.; see also 11 Alvl:. JUR. Proof of 
Facts 3d 601 (2009). Examples of topographical obstacles include mountainous, rocky 
areas, steep canyons, cliffs, flooding rivers, and low wetlands. 11 AM:. JUR. Proof of 
Facts 3d 601 (2009); MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1119-20, 739 P.2d at 418-19 (recognizmg 
an easement by necessity may exist where access to one portion of property is adequate 
but another portion of the property is isolated by topographical features). Topographical 
barriers may justify an easement by necessity even when the barriers are only seasonal. 
See Liles v. Wedding, 733 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding easement by 
Creason, Moore & Dokken, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer &35, Lewiston, ID &3501 
(20&) 743-1516; Fax: (208) 746-2231 
necessity had been established when Claimants alternative means of access was 
untraversable half of the time because of flooding); Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 
192 (Vt. 2006) (concluding easement implied by necessity existed over road wben the 
plaintiff would otherwise be left without consistent practical means of accessing the 
property because other access did not exist during the winter); Bochi v. Shaffer, 1999 WL 
33438818, *.2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing an easement implied by necessity 
may exist during the periods when the primary access road is impassable) (unreported); 
cf Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 82, 665 P.2d 1081, 1092 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding no 
easement by necessity existed where claimed easement access and alternative access 
were both unavailable during the winter months). 
In the event the court concludes the Hochs did not obtain an express easement, 
they have an easement over the upper road based on the theory of easement implied by 
necessity. First, there was unity of ownership of the dominant estate (now owned by the 
Hochs) and the servient estates (now owned by the Sweets, Vances, and Cridlebaugh). 
Each parcel was owned by Cridlebaugh prior to the subdivision of the 90 acre tract. 
Second, there was a necessity for the easement at the time of severance because, without 
the easement, the Hochs property was inaccessible during the winter months and only 
accessible by four wheel drive vehicle at other times. Third, topographical features make 
an easement over the upper road reasonably necessary. Due to the terrain and heavy 
snow that accumulates during the winter months, alternative access to the Hochs' 
property is unavailable during the winter. At such times, the Hochs' only access to their 
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property is through use of the.upper road. Accordingly, an easement over the upper road 
is necessary for the Hochs to put their_property to practical use as their family residence. 5 
2. The Hochs have an easement implied from prior use over the upper road .. 
An easement implied from prior use exists when the plaintiff establishes there 
was: (1) "unity oftitle and subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate"; (2) 
apparent and continuous use of the easement for "long enough before separation of the 
dominant estate to show the use was intended to be permanent"; and (3) the easement is 
"reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate." Beach Lateral 
Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006); Akers v. 
Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 45, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2009); Bob Daniels & Sons v. 
Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). In determining 
whether there is reasonable necessity, courts focus on whether access was necessary at 
the time of severance rather than present necessity. Harrison, 142 Idaho at 605, 130 P.3d 
at 1143. Thus, unlike easements implied by necessity, easements implied from prior use 
are not extinguished once access is no longer reasonably necessary. Id. 
The Hochs have an easement implied by prior use over the upper road. As 
discussed above, there was unity of title of the dominant and servient estates before 
severance and the easement was reasonably necessary at the time of severance. Thus, the 
first and third elements required to establish an· easement implied from prior use are 
satisfied. The final element, apparent and continuous use, is also present. Cridlebaugh 
testified that the upper road has existed on the property since he purchased the 90 acres in 
5 Should the court conclude access to the upper road is only necessary during the winter, an easement 
implied by necessity exists on a seasonal basis. See, e.g., Bochi v. Shaffer, 1999 WL 33438818, *2-3 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
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1999 and that he used ·the road to .access the Hoch property during his period of 
ownership. By continuing to use the road and reserving an easement over the road in ihe 
grants to the Sweets and V ances, it is evident Cridlebaugh intended the easement to be 
permanent. Because there is evidence supporting each of the three elements necessary to 
prove an easement implied from prior use, the HochB also have an easement over the 
upper road based on that theory. 
IV. 'CONCLUSION 
The Hochs have an easement over the upper road based on each of the following 
theories: the grant of an express easement, an easement implied by necessity, and an 
easement implied from prior use. As such, summary judgment should be entered in their 
favor and their request for an injunction preventing the neighbors from interfering with 
the easement should be granted. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2009. 
CREASON, MOORE & DOKKEN, PLLC 
heodore 0. Creason 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch 
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Attorney at Law 
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322 Main Street 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, 
Husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY 


















TO ENJOIN DEFENDANTS 
FROM OBSTRUCTING 
EASEMENT 
COME NOW JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, husband and wife, and for cause 
of action against the defendants, JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, and 
~ 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, and allege as follows: 
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I. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, that 
adjoins defendant Vance's property to the west and defendant Sweet's property to the north, more 
particularly described as follows: 
The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, 
Official records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
II. 
Defendants ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, are the owners of a 
tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State ofidaho, that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the east, 
more particularly described as follows: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
III. 
Defendants JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, are the ovm.ers of a 
·tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the 
south, more particularly described as follows: 
The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official 
Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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IV. 
Prior to October 12, 2000, all u1ree of the above described properties were owned by JACK 
W. CRIDLEBAUGH, the plaintiffs and defendants common gr&.1.tor. 
V. 
On October 12, 2000, said JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the defendants Vance 
the land described in paragraph II above by Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument 
No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
VI. 
The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Vance reserved, in favor of 
Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and egress, including the following: 
"TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running 
from public right-of-way to the above described real property which 
are appurtenances to said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all 
easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to 
the above described real property which are appurtenances to said 
real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed." 
VII. 
On October 10, 2001, said JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the defendants Sweet 
the land described in paragraph III above by Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as 
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Instrument No. 66802.5, records of ]\fez Perce County, Ida..110. A copy of said vVarn:mty Deed is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
VIII. 
The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Sweet reserved, in favor of 
Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and egress, including the follmving: 
"TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress 
and egress over and across existing roads located on the following 
described property: The East half of the Northwest Quarter and the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter, all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West 
of the Boise Meridian, the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and 
assigns, said easements." 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all 
easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to 
the above described property which are an appurtenances to said real 
property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed." 
IX. 
On March 26, 2002, said JACK CRIDLEBAUGH conveyed to the plaintiffs the real 
property described in paragraph I above by Warranty Deed recorded March 26, 2002 as Instrument 
No. 673441, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. Said Warranty Deed provided, in part, as 
follows: 
"SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and 
responsibilities set forth in the following easements: 
5. Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights 
incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 
16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
(The deed conveying the property to the defendants Vance.) 
6. Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights 
incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 
10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho." 
(The deed conveying the property to the defendants Sweet.) 
x. 
On November 17, 2007, the defendants Sweet mailed to the plaintiffs a letter stating that any 
easement across their property would be terminated at the latest on June 30, 2008. A copy of said 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference. 
XI. 
In furtherance of their threat to terminate ingress and egress easement which the plaintiffs 
enjoy over the property owned by defendants Sweet, on at least three occasions since June 30, 2008, 
the defendants Sweet have blocked access to plaintiffs' property. Most recently, the blockage was 
over the weekend ofJuly 12 and 13, 2008 and on July 16, 2008 when the defendants placed a tractor 
in the middle of the easement. A photograph depicting the blocking of the easement is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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Since the blockage of the Plaintiff's access to their property by the defendants Sweet in July 
of 2008, the Defendant's Vance have caused a survey to be completed of their property. The 
preliminary results of said survey, which is not as the date of the filing of this complaint been filed 
for record in Nez Perce County, Idaho, indicate that the north-south boundary line dividing the 
Plaintiffs property from the Defendants Vance's property has shifted from the location as originally 
understood by the parties, to the West. As a result thereof, the Defendants Vance have taken the 
position that a portion of the Plaintiff's access road actually lies on their property. The Defendants 
Vance have removed the impediments theretofore placed on said access road by the Defendants 
Sweet, and have placed an earthen obstacle on said road thereby again cutting Plaintiff access to 
their property. 
XIII. 
Without the use of such access granted to the plaintiffs by Jack Cridlebaugh, the plaintiffs 
will not be able to complete the construction of their home on the premises, or after construction of 
the home have reasonable year round access to their property. 
XIV. 
Unless the defendants Sweet and Vance are restrained from blocking the easement, the 
plaintiffs will be without reasonable year around access to their property. The plaintiffs will suffer 
damages which are impossible to assess at the present time. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at 
law and are restricted to this application for injunctive relief. 
Vijiy~m:Q ENJOIN 
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Vv'h'EREFORE, piaintiffs request: 
1. That the Court permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants, JAKE SVVEET and 
AlJDREY SWEET, husband and wife, from blocking the easement across defendants' Sweet real 
property to the plaintiffs' real property. 
2. That the Court permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants, ROB V Ai"l\JCE and 
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, from blocking the easement across defendants' Vance real 
property to the plaintiffs real property. 
3. That the plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in the 
prosecution of this action for the common benefit of the parties hereto pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121. 
4. Granting plaintiffs any other relief, in law or in equity, to which it deems plaintiff to 
be entitled. 
5. For costs of suit as prescribed by law; 
6. For such further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
0J 
DATED this?-1 day of October, 2008. 
JONES, BROVV'ER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and 
states: 
We are the plaintiffs named herein; we have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
TO ENJOIN DEFENDANTS FROM OBSTRUCTING EASEMENT, know the contents thereof, 
and that the allegations therein made are true as I verily believe. 
CAROLED.HOCH 
~· 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisJ(ll day of October, 2008. 
/,Z~ 
~A,,-'L, 
Notary Public ita for the Stafe ofidaho, 
Residing at Lewrston therein. 
My commission expires 
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D~K~Efi:Rmtb'BS'D.DEFlfilNDANTS' 




INDEXED 41· / 
PILMED c-r 
DEl.JVERED ( ) 
MAILED j'-{ ( ) 
j I 
WARRANTY DEED 
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unman·ied person, as Grantor, does 
hereby grarrt, bargain, sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband ru'1d 
wi±e, the Grantees, whose cun-ent address is 14400-13 0th A venue N.E., Kirkla.i1d, Washington 
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, 
State of Idaho; to-wit 
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 
33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's vvritten 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYzNWY4) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWY4 SWY4 
NE!4) a!! located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
sh.all not exceed one ( l) year; 




C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carTied on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in ai.1y way materially interfere with the guiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel ovmers. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive man11er. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be a.lk1wed to ren:min on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used formofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactmed homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
ovmer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste m::-Ltter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce suc:.h 
tenns. 
SlJBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURJ."l\TER ar1d 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded 
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho. 
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SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DAJ.E R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband a.rid 
wite, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an tmmruTied man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho." 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, 
husband and \vife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a docwnent granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000 and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this _ day 
of October, 2000. 
GRANTOR: 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) 
On this /IJ 1'\iay of October, 2000, before me, the m1dersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. , \ \ 11111111 111 • \\ I; \·' '{SLLS1 ., 
.;::.'- 1>-':;\11\lill•IJ11~f/)·· /~ 
j ~:§·' '!~:.:_ -::&. ~ . ll.. ~ - , jl / -
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~ % PUBUC 1".~!~Puc ~!:he State of Idaho, 
S :--:/ ~e.s1cling at . . 
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1111 1i111111\1v1y commission expires .w~ / q· t7"V.f-
~~TI:FS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTS' 






For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does 
hereby grant, bargain. sell and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and 
y,:ife. the Grantees, whose current address is I '5'1 L,.-f:r"'54- d.:..~~~ ui ,qii~flris interest 
[n the foI!oYving described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 
4 \Nest of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property, including 
but not limited to the easements set forthin that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between 
MlKE T. McHARGUE, an unmarried man, as Grantor, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded 
September 4, 1987 ~nder Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and 
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also kno\:VJ.1 as 
EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and 
l-«IICHAEL T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHARGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee, 
recorded April 3, 1986 tmder Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
and that certain Easement by and between John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband 
and -.vife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A CASSELL, 
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL 
N. \VcINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a 
single man, recorded under Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER \VITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and 
across existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the 
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, 
the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress rnnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
PLAINTIFFS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTS' 
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A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grai.1tor shall not be required to give as long as he 
ovvns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYiNW~) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Qualier (NWY.. SWY.. 
NEY.i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shaH NOT be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This_:r.estriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (1) year; 
c. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way mate1ially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel own~rs. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to pe1manent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constrncted on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on lhe roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall bi; completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
PLAINTIFFS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTSi-
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Oi'mer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. .ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
tenns. 
S OBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and :MIKE McHARGUE, recorded 
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and 
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Trnstees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, 
husband and wifo, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public uti1ities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth i11 a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMP ANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Gramc:es, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the SJid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all 
encumbrances except those set forth .above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2001 and 
there.after; and that he \Vili warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
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1N w1TNESS Vv'HEREOF, the said Gr::mtor has hereLmto set his hand and seal this / V day 
of October, 2001. 
GRA..NTOR: 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) . 
On this /J 7?a;of October, 2001, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State afida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
~~TI~FS' REPL y TO DEFENDANTS' -4-
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WARRANTY DEED 
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried perso~ as Grantor, does 
hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH aI1d CAROLED. HOCH, husband 
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is '!o~ ?gtJS'PECTt l.f\D11>.To o 
1 
{ 7> , all of 
· his interest in the foUowin'.?: described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, 
to-wit: 
The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Tovvnship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridi~ official Records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER VVITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in 
the following easements: 
. ·-
1) Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R TURNER and 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL 
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and 11IKE McHARGUE, 
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, 
. Idaho. 
2) Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband 
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK 
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded 
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759,records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 1 
Li 
,J. l· 
3) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded, July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, 
records of Nez Per~e County, Idaho. 
4) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental ther..dta as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, 
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. · 
-1-
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6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor1s written 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
ovvns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EYzNWV..) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWV.. SW~ 
NE~) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five ( 5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deedis recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOI be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (1) year; 
C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners .. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
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H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Granter does hereby covenant to and with 
·.~,·::; 
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are Iree from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and def end the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this 2-(o, -t4 
day of March, 2002. 
GRANTOR: t AcLJJ) ~ . I \ ,, \I f ~~· . 1-v._J.g,_~...d !~ 
JACK W. CRIDLEBAGH l 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) 
On this ~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lmovm or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing ii."1.strument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. · 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
7 . 
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November 171 2007 
John and Carol 
1N8 
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You certainly must be thrilled to see the building of your dream home 
coming into the final stages of assembly, as you approach the day 
that you too, get to move in and start enjoying the peace, quiet, 
seclusion, and enjoyment of country living here on the mountain. 
With winter quickly approaching and the beauty of the changing 
season, Audrey S!Jd I were reflecting back on how much we have 
enjoyed our past several years living here. Probable like yourselves, 
our dream has always·been to live away from all the hustle-bustle of 
city living, and enjoy a slower pace of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, 
without allthe noise, interruptions, and traffic associated with city 
living. So, with those thoughts still fresh in our minds, we wanted to 
again revisit the subject and previous conversations we have had 
regarding your use of our road. As you recall, during our initial 
discussions on this matter we granted you permission for construction 
access across our road and property to assist you and your 
contractors in having ready made access to your construction site. I 
think you would have to agree, that this construction access across 
our road and property has been most helpful in assisting you in a 
much timelier and substantially less costly approach to the 
construction of your new home! As neighbors we were happy to 
assist you in this way, as we too know that at this elevation you have 
a considerably shorter construction window than down in town. 
While it appears that the majority of the construction of your new 
house is nearing completion, we know you still have some work that 
will likely be continuing over the next few months. As wintei is quickly 
approaching and ground freeze and snow are already making a 
PLA§ffi¥'Ji~~<fl the transition into winter, we have decided for the time . ~ 7/1 
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being l to make no lmmedlate changes to our previous permission for 
you to gain construction access to your home by entering and exiting 
it across our road and property. As always, we expect you and your 
contractors to treat the road with respect, maintain a slow and 
reasonable speed, watch for our grandchildren and dogs at play, and 
promptly assist with maintenance and repairs as needed and 
"""~pif"op=ia"'~ Di.),"~. 'I J "'°'.'.'.)r; r ! ' 1_ il;.·~..r'v, 
As I stated above, Audrey and my dream has always been to live 
away from all the hustle-bustle of city living, and enjoy a slower pace 
of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, without all the noise, interruptions, 
and traffic associated with city life. Obviously, ;tis no surprise to 
either of us that this has not been the case since we. granted you 
construction access for the building of your new house. To put it 
frankly, the traffic;·not knowing who is coming and going, dust, dogs 
always barking at passing cars, and vehicles driving so close to our 
home is much more disturbing than we had ever anticipated; 
however, it is something that we have agreed to handle for a while 
longer and is truly the neighborly thing to do. 
As your major construction will be coming to an end in the next month 
· or so, we will be into the snowy freezing months of winter when 
outside work .is almost impossible. Therefore, we don 1t feel it 
reas·onable at this time fo ask you to start building or using an 
alternate access route to your home, rather than the construction 
route you have been using across our road and property. However, 
you need to start planning now on upgrading your initial and legal 
access road to your home, such that any required construction or 
upgrade work on it can commence as soon as spring weather allows. 
Even with a late spring, there is no reason for you to not have your 
own access road to your new home completed by the end of June 
2008. This gives you eight months to plan and obtain any needed 
permissions, permits, contractors, materials, or any other items that 
may be needed for the timely completion of your own road. 
Therefore, Audrey and I have agreed that your construction access to 
your home across our road and property will terminate as soon as 
your road is completed, and under no circumstances later than June :J..7 / 
~~I~$.EPL y TO DEFENDANTS' 
ETS' REPL y MEMORANDUM 
I 
.13 
We feel as neighbors we have been very fair and patient in providing 
you construction access; however, .as you know, it was never 
intended to be anything more than temporary for the purposes of 
construction. The removal of all outside traffic going across our 
place a!lov.ts us both to get on with our liv~s and pursue our priorities, 
Having your own access road to ycmr home elknNs y:ou to monltor 
,f'(l?ljr: ,~,j t' r' ;i.p .PJ1""1"'~,;;;;;: ~J"'d ~;::;/'.! .1d}\J V.1''ic11ii' 7,.--, ... :;,p"j 
v~i L,. Y9 ~.,.,,.,. ~ ....... ~~ ....... ....., ~· L .. ~ ~~~kl~ ~'!..J if_,__,,,~~ !! ·vg.i.....l, jJ 
For US, no longer having outside traffic across our road and property 
allows us to monitor and control the access and security of our road, 
property, and dwellings. 
I hope you don't find this letter to be a surprise or harsh. as neither 
are our intent. W~ are neighbors and we feel we have been and are 
continuing to do the right and neighborly thing, otherwise we would 
have never agreed to your construction access in the beginning. We 
just want to communicate this to you in writing to insure you clearly 
understand our position and timeline on the matter of your use of our 
roads and for everyone's safety, security, and overall well being that 
your use must come to an end in the not to distant future. If you have 
any questions or there is any portion of this letter that you don1t 
understand please feel free to give us a call or drop by. 
Best Regards, 
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WARRANTY DEED 
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmanied person, as Grantor, does 
hereby grant, bargain. sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband ar1d 
""Yife, the Grantees, whose cunent address is 14400-130th Avenue N.E., Kirkland, Washington 
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, 
Staie ofldaho~ to-wit: 
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 
33 North. Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress nmning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the follo-wing Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (E'hNWl/t) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWY4 SWl/t 
NEY.t) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall tenninate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of pennanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver ,,.,..... 
shall not exceed one (1) year; ~ f _:? 
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C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carTied on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet e1lioyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean cmd attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be 111'lowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall noLprohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction eqttipment for the preparation of-b:oilding s:ites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structm·es. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used forToofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to n1inimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is p.laced on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste mr.tter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
SlJBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and 
CAROLYN I. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded 
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho. 
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SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TUR.~ER, husband a.11d 
wife, JAC:<: CRlDLEBAUGH, an tmmruTied man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK. Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Inst-ument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho~ 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utili ties and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, 
husband and \vife~ recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEAR WATER POWER COtvn> ANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appmtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000. and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this_ day 
of October, 2000. 
GRANTOR: 
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\, 
On this jtj 1~ay of October, 2000, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in ai1d for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK \V. CRIDLEBAUGH, knovvn or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
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WARRANTY DRED 
for Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Granter, does 
hereby grunt, bargain, sell and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and 
\vife, the Grantees, whose cunent address is I b'I 1.,- et·'s4-- 6t.i!. h~ ~ ,q~~fl1is interest 
in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 
4 1Nest oftii.e Boise Meridian, Official Records ofNez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property, including 
but not limited to the easements set forth in that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between 
i\1IKE T. McHARGUE, an unman-ied man, as Granter, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded 
September 4. 1987 under Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and 
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also knovvn as 
EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and 
~·ITCHAEL T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHARGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee, 
recorded April 3, 1986 under Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
and that certain Easement by and between John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband 
and wife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, 
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL 
N. \VEINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a 
single man, recorded w1der Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER ·wrTH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and 
a.cross existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the 
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, 
the Granter reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GR.ANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
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A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grai--itor shall not be required to give as long as he 
owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EY2NWY.i) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quruter (NW~ SWY.i 
NEY..) all located in Section 22, Township 33 N01ih, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NO.I be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This_r.estriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (I) year; 
C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be earned on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the resirective parcel own~rs. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to pei.manent structilres. 
F. No unpainted conugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constmcted on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on lbe roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall bi: completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
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01\>ner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matteJ 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANJMAl.S.: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
SUBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and. 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded 
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and 
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Tnrstees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURN"ER, 
husband and wifo, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a docwnent granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Gramees, their heirs a11d assigns forever. And the said Granter does hereby covenant to and with 
the s.::iid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 200 l and 
thereaf1.er; and that he \vili warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
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IN VV1TNESS \ii/HEREOF, the said Grn.ntor has hereLmto set 1Jis hand and seal this /vt;· 
of October, 2001. 
GRANT OR: 
JACK W. CR_TDLEBAUGH 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) . 
flv . 
On this //J ~day of October, 2001, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State ofida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
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WARRANTY DEED 
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does 
hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, husband 
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is 'fo!i: ?got;.f>EcT, lf\Pl~To u, { b , all of 
' ) 
his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, 
to-wit: 
The West Half of the Northeast Quai-ter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, official Records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in 
the following easements: 
1) Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R TURNER and 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL 
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and .MIKE McHARGUE, 
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, 
.Idaho. 
2) Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband 
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK 
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded 
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759,records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. i .• 
J .J 
3) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, 
records of Nez Per.:;e County, Idaho. 
4) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto· as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, 
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rig.lits incidental thereto 
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
OWTIS any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EY.zNWY.) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NW~ SW~ 
NE1/.i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five ( 5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NQI be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (1) year; 
C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners .... 
D. Each parcei shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent ofthis restriction being to miniinize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. \ . 
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H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
~? 
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are Iree from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN \VITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantor has hereunto set his hand and seal this ..?::k ti;, 
day of March, 2002. 
GRANTOR: 
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County of Nez Perce ) 
On this ~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lrnovvn or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me faat he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year :first above written. 
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CASE NO. CV 08-2272 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case comes before me on the Hochs' motion for summary judgment. 
CONTENTIONS 
The Hochs, Vances and Sweets acknowledge an easement common to all property 
owners and others on what is called the lower road. This dispute is about whether or not 
the Hochs have an easement over what is called the upper road that traverses the Sweet 
parcel and crosses a corner of the Vance parcel. 
The Hochs complain that the Sweets have wrongfully obstructed their access to 
their easement over the upper road. The Sweets and the Vances submit they are 
entitled to block access because the Hochs do not have an easement over the upper 
road. They base their submission on contention that the upper road was not a 
"roadway" within the contemplation of the deeds, that the deeds are ambiguous so the 
intentions of the parties to the conveyances are relevant to what easements were 
conveyed and that in any event the easement created over the upper road by the deed 
to the Sweets was personal to Mr. Cridlebaugh and did not run with the land. 
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The Vances also argue the Hoch deed is ambiguous because the preexisting 
(Turner) appurtenant easements are referred to by instrument numbers in the Hoch 
deed but the easement over the upper road created in the Sweet deed is not referred to 
in the Hoch deed by instrument numbers. This, they argue, indicates an intention to 
treat the upper road differently, that is, not appurtenant, than the Turner easements, 
which are specifically described as appurtenant. The Hochs posit, in response, that 
their deed unambiguously and without any material factual dispute conveys an 
appurtenant easement over the upper road. 
FACTS 
Jack Cridlebaugh bought ninety acres of land at Waha in Nez Perce County. He 
subdivided the property into several parcels. He sold twenty acres to Rob and Becky 
Vance on October 12, 2000, forty acres to Jake and Audrey Sweet on October 10, 2001 
and twenty acres to John and Carol Hoch on March 26, 2002. He retained ten acres for 
himself. 
Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed his interests in the land to the grantees by 
warranty deeds. The Vances deed conveyed the east half of the northeast quarter of 
the northwest quarter of section 22 and it included the following easement provisions: 
TOGETHER WITH all easement for ingress and egress running from public 
right-of-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to 
said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs' and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and egress running from public property, together with an easement over 
and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 
ORDER - 2 
The conveyance was also made subject to preexisting easements by referring to them 
by their recorded instrument numbers (Turner easements). The parties agree that the 
Turner easements are across the lower road. 
The Sweet deed conveyed the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of 
section 22, together with and subject to ingress and egress easements "across existing 
roads located" on described portions of the northwest quarter of section 22. The parties 
agree this language creates an easement over the upper road. Mr. Cridlebaugh also 
reserved the same easements and subjected the conveyance to the same Turner 
easements as he had in the Vance deed. 
Mr. Cridlebaug h conveyed to the Hochs "all of his interest" in the west half of the 
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 22. The conveyance included the 
"rights and responsibilities in the following easements," which included the Turner 
easements and "(5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights 
incidental thereto as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument 
No. 657867[Vance deed], records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, (6) Easement for the 
purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as reserved in a Warranty 
Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 668025 [Sweet deed] records of 
Nez Perce County, Idaho." 
The Sweets and the Vances aver when they bought their parcels that what is 
now referred as the upper road did not exist as a road. They conclude, therefore, that it 
does not come within the ambit of the "roads" and "roadways" over which Mr. 
Cridlebaugh created and reserved easements in their deeds. 
Mr. Cridlebaugh testified that when he bought the property there were two 
access easements to it from Stagecoach Road, an upper one and a lower one. He 
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testified that the upper road was steep and rutted but that he could get a pickup across 
it. Once he owned the property he hired Bert Teats to blade both roads to make them 
passable by a pickup. He had Mr. Teats fix the roads in 1997 or 1998 so he could log 
the property before he sold it. He describes the upper road as follows: 
It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from, well, 
from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a loop before I 
bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a westerly direction in front 
of Vances, made a loop out toward the Hochs' property and then went right back 
up this way, out to my ten acres. P19 of deposition. 
Jake Sweet confirms the upper road existed but that it was impassable much of 
the year because it went into a ravine. He later filled the ravine so it was more 
amenable to travel. He also says that a portion of the upper road was only passable by 
A TVs until he removed a large stump. Prior to the work he did or had done on it, he did 
not consider it a road. 
Ms. Vance says the upper road ended at the Sweet house until Mr. Sweet 
extended it to the Hoch property. 
Mr. Cridlebaugh testified that he reserved an easement over the upper road in 
the Sweet deed so he could access the property he eventually sold to the Hochs from 
the ten acres he retained. At oral argument the parties agreed that that was what he 
had done. 
Following the conveyance to the Hochs in 2002 they began building a house on 
their parcel. With the consent of the Vances, they used the upper road to facilitate the 
construction logistics. In November of 2007, the Vances notified the Hochs that 
"access to your home across our road and property will terminate a soon as your road 
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is completed, and under no circumstances later than June 30, 2008." Since then the 
Vances have obstructed access to the Hochs home by way of the upper road. This 
action followed. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary resolution of this dispute is only available in the absence of any material 
factual issue. Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698 (1992). The first inquiry, therefore, is 
whether the deed to the Hochs is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous a factual inquiry will be 
necessary to determine the material issue of what the parties intended. 
The Sweets and the Vances argue that the grantor's reservation clause provides 
that only the Turner easements that existed over the lower road when the property was 
conveyed are appurtenant and the newly created easements "over and across all 
roadways presently existing on the property" are personal to Mr. Cridlebaugh and do 
not run with the land because he did not describe them as appurtenant. They conclude 
that the deeds are therefore ambiguous. 
The text of a document is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two reasonable but 
conflicting interpretations. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499 (2005); Latham v. 
Gamer, 105 Idaho 854, 858 (1983). Whether or not there are reasonable but 
conflicting interpretations must be viewed in the context of all the documents in which 
the questioned language is found and from that language which the documents have 
been incorporated by reference. See, Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508 (2003) 
("The intent of the parties is determined by viewing the conveyance instrument as a 
whole."). 
It is important in real property transactions for all parties to be able to rely on the 
written documents without having to guess what was intended. Deeds and agreements 
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are written for the laudable aim of avoiding confusion and having to guess about what 
was intended. Cannon v. Perry, 141 Idaho 728, 731 (2007). When construing the 
deeds and the nature of the easements, I am obliged to examine the language and the 
circumstances leading up to and involving the conveyances. Read, 141 Idaho at 500; 
Bums v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1992); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck 
& D. Whitman, Property§ 8.1, 8.16, 8.25 (1984); Conrad, Words Which Will Create an 
Easement, 6 Mo. L. Rev. 245 (1941). 
The documents are deeds conveying multiple parcels from a single piece of 
land. The Vance deed grants "all easements for ingress and egress" to the Vances and 
reserves to the grantor, "his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and egress" 
and grants new easements "across all roadways presently existing." The 
circumstances surrounding these real property transactions make it obvious that Mr. 
Cridlebaugh is ensuring access over the property he has sold to the property he has yet 
to sell or which he may decide to keep. 
The Sweet deed conveyed the forty acres that lie between the ten acres Mr. 
Cridlebaugh eventually decided to keep and the twenty acre Hoch property, which at 
that time he still owned. The parties agree and the deed reflects that Mr. Cridlebaugh 
created a specific easement over the upper road across the Sweet property that was 
necessary to gain access from his ten acres to the twenty acres the Hoch would buy the 
next year. That conclusion is confirmed by the deed's recitation that the purpose of 
subjecting the Sweet property to the easement is for "ingress and egress." 
Mr. Cridlebaugh then reserved to himself, "his heirs and assigns, all easements 
for ingress and egress ... which are appurtenances to said real property, together with 
an easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein 
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being conveyed." 
In summary, Mr. Cridlebaugh created an access easement over the upper road 
from his ten acres to the twenty acres the Hochs later bought. He then reserved to 
himself, his heirs and assigns all existing easements of which that was one. I conclude 
that the upper road easement Mr. Cridlebaugh created and reserved for himself and his 
heirs and assigns was conveyed to the Hochs by paragraph (6) where he conveyed the 
ingress and egress easement that he had reserved in the Sweet deed. 
I find nothing ambiguous about that language. An access easement 
between two separate pieces of property is created by the granter over the property 
being sold, the grantor then reserves that easement to himself so he can use it and 
then he later conveys it by reference to the people who bought the parcel for which the 
easement had been created to provide access. This is about us straight forward as 
straight forward gets. 
It is also noteworthy that if Mr. Cridlebaugh had wanted to exempt the upper road 
easement from his deed to the Hochs he could and should have said so because the 
Hochs were entitled to rely on what their deed said. Mr. Cridlebaugh not only did not 
exempt the upper road easement in the Sweet deed from the Hoch deed, he 
specifically conveyed "all of his interest in the" described property. The grant to the 
Hochs is "TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises unto said Grantees, their heirs 
and assigns forever." Here, as was the case in R.C.R. Inc., the deed "contains no 
limitations on the transferability of the easement and, in fact, contemplates future 
transfers of both the dominant and servient estates." 978 P2d at 586-587. 
The Vances argue, nonetheless, that because the Turner easements were 
described as appurtenant and referred to by instrument number and the upper road 
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easement was not so described and not referred to by instrument numbers that the 
upper road easement is in gross. 
I am unpersuaded. An appurtenant easement does not depend on some 
talismanic phrase for its creation. Tower Asset. Sub. Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 
714 (2007). It is created by language that imposes a servitude on a land over which the 
easement runs for the purpose enhancing the utility of the land to which goes. "An 
easement is appurtenant to land when the easement is created to benefit and does 
benefit the possessor of the land in his use of the land." Weber v. Johnston Fuel Lines, 
Inc., 519 P2d 972, 975 (Wyo. 1974)). It cannot be gainsaid that access to one's 
property enhances one's ability to use it. 
Ambiguity is not created by how one incorporates other documents by reference 
but rather by what the language itself says. Even if that were a possible interpretation, 
it would not be a reasonable one in light of the presumption against easements in gross 
when the language and the nature of the easement lend themselves to an appurtenant 
construction. Nelson v. Johnson, 106 Idaho 385, 387-388 (1984) ("In cases of doubt, 
the weight of authority holds that the easement should be presumed appurtenant."); 
Todd v. Nobach, 118 NW 2d 402, 405 (Mich. 1962); Lynn v. Turpin, 215 8a2d 794, 795-
796 (Tenn. 1948). 
Finally the parties argue the deeds are ambiguous because there is a dispute 
about what the terms "roads" and "roadways" mean in the Sweet deed where Mr. 
Cridlebaugh created an easement on "existing roads" over the Sweet property to the 
twenty acres that Hochs later bought and the easements he reserved "over and across 
all roadways presently existing" in the reservation clause. 
I find that there is an issue of fact regarding what the parties viewed as a road; 
ORDER - 8 
that is, whether it had to be passable for a pickup to qualify as a road. There is, 
however, no material issue of fact that Mr. Cridlebaugh reserved as easement over 
what was referred to by the parties as the upper road. As a result it is not necessary to 
determine what Mr. Cridlebaugh meant by phrase, "together with an easement over and 
across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed" in the 
grantor's reservation clause in the Vance and Sweet deeds, since an appurtenant 
easement over what was called the upper road, whether or not it was understood to be 
an actual road or an A TV trail, had already been created in the Sweet deed and 
conveyed by reference in the Hoch deed. 
I conclude the deeds are not ambiguous and there is no material issue of fact to 
be resolved and the deeds must therefore be enforced as they unambiguously read. 
understand that this result may not be what Mr. Cridlebaugh intended or what the 
Sweets and Vances expected. But I do not reach their intentions because the Hochs 
were entitled to rely on what they were conveyed in the deed they received. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated the Hochs' motion for summary Judgment is GRANTED 
as to the existence of an appurtenant easement on the upper road. This order does not 
address to the precise route or scope of the easement. 
It is so ordered this ~ ~ day of December 2009. 
Otvk,_'-;I·~ 
_,{~N BRADBURY {) 
District Judge 
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ORDER - 10 
~--------- ----- ............ ~----- - -
Fax fro111 : 208 746 2231 
FILED Theodore 0. Creason, lSB # 1563 
Cynthia L Mosher, ISB # 7988 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & Ut:lDI.1IOOIJlJJJ lS ffl 9 
1219 Idaho Street 
15 
P.O. Drmver 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 
Fax: (208) 746-223 l 
PATTY 0. wu:~.s 
CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT 
DE~1r 
-10 01:38p Pg: 3 
1N THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF ID.A.HO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOfIN M. HOCH and CAROLED. 
HOCH, husband and \Vife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 
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ORl>.EK GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
A MEND COMPLAINT 
The Plaintiffs' Tvfotion to Amend Cornplaint having come before the Court telephonically 
on June 10, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., the plaintiffs were represented by one of their· attorneys, 
Cynthia L Mosher of Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC, the defendants Sweet were 
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their attorney, W. J crcmy Carr of Clark and Feeney, ::ind the Court having been fully advised in 
the premises, hereby makes the fo1lowing order: 
ORDER GRANTING PLAlNTl.FFS' MOTION 
TO AJVIEND COM.PLAINT - l 
Pg: 4 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs arc granted leave to amend their complaint as 
shown by the proposed Amended Complaint arrache<l tu Plaintiffs' Motion to Ai.nend Complaint 
dated :tvfo y 3, 2010. 
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Case No. CV08-2272 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, by 
and through their counsel of record, Theodore 0. Creason, of Creason, Moore, Dokken, & 
Geidl, PLLC, and for cause of action against the defendants, allege and complain as follows: 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land located in Nez Perce County, State of 
Idaho that adjoins defendant Vance's property to the west and defendant Sweet's property to the 
north, more particularly described as follows: 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1 
toc!hoch/pleadinglcomplaint. amended 30 ( 
The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Tov.rnship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
2. Defendants ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, are the o\\'llers 
of a tract ofland located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho that adjoins plaintiffs' property to the 
east, more particularly described as follows: 
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
To\\'llship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
3. Defendants JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, husband and wife, are the 
o\\'llers of a tract ofland located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho that adjoins plaintiffs' property 
to the south, more particularly described as follows: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, 
Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
4. Prior to October 12, 2000, all three of the above described properties were o\\'lled by 
JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, the plaintiffs' and defendants' common grantor. 
5. On October 12, 2000, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the defendants Vance the land 
described in paragraph 2 above by Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
6. The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Vance (hereinafter Vance 
Deed) reserved, in favor of Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and 
egress, including the followin~: 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-
of-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real 
property. 
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RESERVlNG UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real 
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement 
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 
7. The Vance Deed also included several restrictive covenants, including the 
following: 
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each 
of the respective parcel owners. 
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
Exhibit A, p. 2. 
8. As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Vance Deed provides that 
"[e]ither Granter or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above." 
Exhibit A, p. 2. 
9. On October 10, 2001, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the defendants Sweet the land 
described in paragraph 3 above by Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001, as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
10. The Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to the defendants Sweet (hereinafter Sweet 
Deed) reserved, in favor of Cridlebaugh, his heirs and assigns, certain easements for ingress and 
egress, including the following: 
TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over 
and across existing roads located on the following described property: The East 
half of the Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
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of the Northeast Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 
West of the Boise Meridian, the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, 
said easements. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real 
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement 
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 
11. The Sweet Deed also included several restrictive covenants, including the 
following: 
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which rnay be or rnay become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each 
of the respective parcel owners. 
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
Exhibit B, p. 2. 
12. As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Sweet Deed provides that "[ e Ji ther 
Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above." Exhibit B, p. 3. 
13. On March 26, 2002, Cridlebaugh conveyed to the plaintiffs the real property 
described in paragraph 1 above by Warranty Deed recorded March 26, 2002 as Instrument No. 
673441, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. A copy of said Warranty Deed is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. Said Warranty Deed conveyed the property as 
follows: 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in 
the following easements: 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Vance Deed]. 
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6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Sweet Deed]. 
14. The Warranty Deed Cridlebaugh conveyed to the Hochs (hereinafter Hoch Deed) 
also contained the following restrictive covenants: 
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each 
of the respective parcel owners. 
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
Exhibit C, p. 2. 
15. As a remedy for violation of the covenants, the Hoch Deed provides that "[ e ]ither 
Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and conditions set forth above." Exhibit C, p. 3. 
16. On November 17, 2007, the defendants Sweet mailed the plaintiffs a letter stating 
that any easement across their property would be terminated at the latest on June 30, 2008. A copy 
of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference. 
17. In furtherance of their threat to terminate the ingress and egress easement which the 
plaintiffs enjoy over the property owned by the defendants, on several occasions since June 30, 
2008, the defendants have blocked access to plaintiffs' property. The most recent blockage was 
discovered on February 11, 2010, after the defendants placed a snow bank across the roadway. A 
photograph depicting a prior blocking of the easement through the use of a tractor is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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18. On December 28, 2009, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order 
acknowledging the plaintiffs are the owners of a valid easement over Black Bear Bend, or what 
has been referred to as the "upper road." 
19. Since the Court issued its Order, the defendants have continued to obstruct the 
plaintiffs' access to their property over the upper road. 
20. Without the use of such access granted to the plaintiffs by Cridlebaugh and 
recognized by the Court, the plaintiffs will not be able to complete the construction of their home on 
the premises or have reasonable year-round access to their property. 
21. Since the defendants began obstructing the plaintiffs' access, the defendants have 
also engaged in a continuous pattern of harassing and threatening the plaintiffs and their guests 
visiting the property. 
22. In addition to verbal threats and harassing statements, the defendants have 
brandished weapons and physically threatened the plaintiffs and their guests. 
23. Defendants have continued to interfere with the plaintiffs' reasonable use and 
enjoyment of their property. Aside from blocking the plaintiffs' easement and otherwise 
harassing the plaintiffs, defendants Vance have constructed and maintained an unsightly junk 
pile on the property line they share with the plaintiffs. 
24. On several occasions the defendants have also entered onto the plaintiffs' 
property without permission. Most recently, on February 11, 2010, Audrey Sweet entered onto 
the plaintiffs' property and threatened Mr. Hoch. Mrs. Sweet aggressively approached Mr. Hoch 
while waving her arms and papers at him and threatening to cause him physical injury. 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
25. Jurisdiction is proper in the district court pursuant to Idaho Code section 1-2210. 
26. Venue is proper in the district court for the Second Judicial District pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 5-401. 
COUNT I: NUISANCE 
27. Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against 
the defendants further allege as follows: 
28. The defendants' actions have interfered with the plaintiffs' reasonable use and 
comfortable enjoyment of their property. 
29. The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the 
defendants' actions. 
30. The defendants' actions have caused the plaintiffs to suffer damages in the form 
of discomfort, distress, inconvenience, and annoyance. Plaintiffs have also suffered damage in 
the form of expenses related to the delay in construction caused by the defendants' blocking of 
the easement and expenses associated with removing obstacles the defendants placed on the 
easement. 
31. Unless the defendants Sweet and Vance are restrained from blocking the easement, 
the plaintiffs will be without reasonable year-round access to their property. 
32. The plaintiffs are entitled to relief from the nuisances caused by the defendants in 
the form of an injunction, an award of damages, or abatement. 
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COUNT II: TRESPASS 
33. Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against 
the defendants further allege as follows: 
34. The defendants have repeatedly entered onto the plaintiffs' property without 
permlSSlOn. 
35. The defendants' unauthorized entrance onto the plaintiffs' land has interfered with 
the plaintiffs' right to exclusive possession of their property. 
36. The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions 
of the defendants. 
COUNT III: BREACH OF COVENANT 
37. Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against 
the defendants further allege as follows: 
38. The covenants contained in the Sweet and Vance Deeds were intended for the 
benefit of the property owned by the plaintiffs. 
39. By maintaining a ju11k pile on the property line shared with the plaintiffs, 
defendants Vance have breached the covenant in their warranty deed requiring them to maintain 
their property in a clean and attractive manner. 
40. By interfering with the plaintiffs' easement, threatening and harassing the 
plaintiffs and their guests, and trespassing onto the plaintiffs' property, the defendants have 
violated the covenant in their warranty deeds prohibiting noxious, illegal or offensive activity, 
nuisances, or actions that "materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of the respective 
parcel owners." 
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41. The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions 
of the defendants. 
COUNT IV: ASSAULT 
42. Plaintiffs reallege the material allegations set forth above and for a claim against 
the defendants further allege as follows: 
43. By physically threatening the plaintiffs, defendants Sweet intended to put 
plaintiffs in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact. 
44. Defendants Sweet's act of aggressively approaching Mr. Hoch while making 
physical threats put Mr. Hoch in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact. 
45. The plaintiffs have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of the actions 
of the defendants. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
1. That the Court enter a judgment defining the location and dimensions of the 
plaintiffs' easement; 
2. That the plaintiffs be awarded damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. That defendants be permanently enjoined from restricting the plaintiffs' access to 
their property through the upper road easement, from interfering with the plaintiffs' reasonable 
use and enjoyment of their land, from violating the restrictive covenants, and from further 
trespasses onto plaintiffs' property; 
4. That plaintiffs be awarded costs and disbursements necessarily expended m 
bringing this action; 
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5. That plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code sections 12-120 and 12-121; and 
6. That plaintiffs be awarded such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
just. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
flLo~ 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of June, 2010, a copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT was served by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 321 
322 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P. 0. Drawer 285 












Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
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EXHIBIT A 
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For Value Received, JACK W. CRlDLEBAUGR, an unmru"Tied person, as Grantor, does 
hereby graiit, bargain, sell and convey unto ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband a.11d 
ivifr, the Grantees, whose current address is 14400-13 Om A venue N .E., Kirkland, Washington 
98034, all of his interest in the following described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, 
State of Idaho, to-wit: 
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, To-wnship 
33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real property. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress nmning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the foliow1ng Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
O\vns any portion of the following described real property: 
8. 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (EV2NW1!4) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Qumier of the Northeast Quarter (NW!f4 SW!f4 
NE~) aU located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall tenninate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the dare this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall ND.I be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of pennanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one ( 1) year; 313 
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C. No noxious, iiiegal or offensive activity shall be ca.nied on upor: any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in ariy way materially interfere witl1 the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners. 
D. Each parcel sha11 be kept in a clean and attractive mmmer. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be .allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit th:e temporru·y 
use of heavy construction equipment for tbe preparation of building siles or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to niinimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactmed homes constructed within four (4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
L No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of any structure) resident or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
ovmer shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste mrLtter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restnct10ns and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
tenns. 
SlJBJECT TO Perpetuai Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and 
CAROLYN J. TURN'ER, husband and wife, and RA.ND ALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, recorded ii 
March 21, 1995 as Instn.iment No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 3 / 7 · 
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l 1.J an easen1ent tor a perpet11al r1gn1-or ... vvay ar10 r1g.hts lTiC1denta1 tnereto as set 
forth in a document to DA.LE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURlJER, husband arid 
wifo, JAG( CPJDLEBAUGH, an unmanied ma11, and TERRY A. CLACK a11d BETTY L. 
CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Inst.t-ument No. 622759, records ofNez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidenta1 thereto as 
set forth in n document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, 
husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the pmpose of public utilities arid rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER C01\1PANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises v.~th their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the said Grantees that he is the ovmer in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from ail 
encwnbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2000 and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN \VITNESS WHEREOF, the said Granter has hereunto set his hand and seal this __ day 
of October, 2000. 
GRANTOR: cic)LvJ .G;_J&~h-
JACK W. CRIDLEB~UGH () 
!.1Hsr-,wi..e£113fo 7 
FIL~ nm RfC£~0 l! ... ,. • 
n: r I a':._ Pr r;. 2 'I 1 --LIA~iJCE 1J TL 
~-- _., __ •! 
2000 OCT I b A. 10: 30 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) 
On this /'],, iJi~ay of October, 2000, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in a11d for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, known or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above VvTi tten. , \, 11 i 1 11u111 '\\ /j 
\-','{SLLS1/r .. / 
,.::::. ,,;t:•'\11\\lllJ/J111!/)" -:;... 
f ~?'·' '11.;~:. -:~. ~ fl ..... _ - , , .I' -
:: = NOT/:.r-w - = V' 0 !i:'ttdZ 
~ ~-' PUBUC 1'!':9:~ Puc :~o!~: State ofidaho, 
-:;. ~i .re.s1c;ling at . ~?? . 
'/ 1..\»:''11, ,,.,-... ~~~, ,;:-. . . / 
~· /,=f'J IJ:1111\•,\\ •~'\. ~""'-
'/!;\, f:::· rv: \'0 r ·\"' /}; / -Q fi7Y-. 
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for Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmai.1ied person, as Grantor, does 
J·ier:::by grnnL bargain, se1l and convey unto JAKE SWEET and AUDREY S\iVEET, husband and 
\VJ fe, the Grantees, whose cun-ent address is l "5' It....- Er'"' 5.\- e.J..4~ k' 1.4 ,qiJ~fhis interest 
i.n the foilo\ving described premises situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho, to-wit: 
The Southeast Quarter of tl1e Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Tm:vnship 33 North, Range 
4 \Vest of rhe Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER WITH alI easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way 
to the above described real property which are appmienances to said real property, including 
but not limited to the easements set forth in that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between 
l\1IKE T. McHARGUE, an unman-ied man, as Grantor, and APC Co., as Grantee, recorded 
Septernbtr 4, 1987 under Instrument No. 514248, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and 
that certain Warranty Deed by and between EVERETT CASSELL, also known as 
EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A. CASSELL, husband and wife, as Grantors, and 
ivIICHAEL T. McHARGUE and MARY C. McHA.RGUE, husband and wife, as Grantee, 
recorded April 3, 1986 under Instrument No. 497394, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, 
and that certain Easement by and betwee11 John Carpenter and Delia Carpenter, husband 
a'1d \.Vife, parties of the first part, and EVERETT J. CASSELL and BERYL A CASSELL, 
husband and wife, parties of the second part, recorded under Instrument No. 401230, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho, and that certain Quitclaim Deed by and between PAUL 
N. \VEINERT and GRACE WEINERT, husband and wife, to MIKE T. McHARGUE, a 
single man, recorded under Instrument No. 478091, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TOGETHER "WITH AND SUBJECT TO an easement for ingress and egress over and 
across existing roads located on the following described property: The East Half of the 
Northwest Quarter and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, 
the Grantor reserving for himself, his heirs and assigns, said easements. 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for ingress and 
egress mnning from public right-of-way to the above described real property which are 
appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 





No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's vvritten 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
ovvns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Qua.rter (EYiNWY'.i) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (1\T\VY.i SWY'.i 
NE:!i) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall hlQI be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (1) year; 
C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way mate1ially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners. 
D. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive malli'1er. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be a1lowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to pe1manent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shalI be built on Lhe roads or rights-of-way. 
I. The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall b~ completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
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ow11er shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter 
and sha11 cause a11 such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANJMALS: No anima1s except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. R EMFDJFS. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
SUBJECT TO Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and: 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and 1vITK.E McHARGUE, recorded 
March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and 
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY L. 
CLACK, Tnistees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 as 
Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities a.11d rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CAROLYN J. TURNER, 
husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, records of Nez Perc.e 
County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
ser forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, recorded 
January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Gmmc::es, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the s.'.lid Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all 
encumb1a1ces except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2001 and 
thereafter; and that he \'!,'in warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
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IN W1TN..cSS \r\FHEREOF, ~he said Gn:mtor has hereLmtu set bi:.; 
of October, 2001. 
GRAl'HOR: 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) . 
~ LL-L ~ . (~·cliu~ L 
JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH 
On this /j ~of October, 2001, before mi:, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
the State ofida~rsonally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, lmown or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoi11g instrument and acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
3~/ 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT_4_ 
EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT C 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT 
.:--·. ~- ......, ....... -- ~ 
~·c,100~0~1 0 ~ :sc 
WA RR A NTY DREn 
For Value Received, JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried person, as Grantor, does 
hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto JOHN M. HOCH and CA.ROLE D. HOCH, husband 
and wife, the Grantees, whose current address is C[o~ 7J?CJe;?EcT1 t,c.'\,!.J\i;"tc u 1 lb , all of 
his i_nterest in the foUowi.115 described premises situate in fae Cou_rity of Nez Perce, State of Idaho, 
to-wit: 
The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Tovmship 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, official Records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in 
the following easements: 
I) Perpetual Reciprocal Easement by and bet'Ween DA.LE R. TURNER and 
CAROLYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL 
and KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, 
recorded March 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
2) Easement for a perpetual right-of-way and rights incidental thereto as set 
forth in a document to DA.LE R. TURJ~ER and CAROLYN J. TURN"ER, husband 
and wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK 
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded 
July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 1 
J) 
3) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TIJRNER and CAROLYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, 
records of Nez Per..:e County, Idaho. 
4) Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COivl:PANY, 
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
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6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rigl1ts incidenta~ thereto 
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as fostrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
A No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's written 
consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give as long as he 
owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Qua.'ier (EY:NWY,.) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NWYi SWY4 
NEYi) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the 
Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) years 
after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
B. Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NQI be utilized 
as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction shall not apply 
during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED this restriction waiver 
shall not exceed one (1) year; 
C. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be canied on upon any parcel, nor 
shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or in any way materially interiere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the respective parcel owners. 
D. Each parcei shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
E. No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to remain on 
the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not prohibit the temporary 
use of heavy construction equipment for the preparation of building sites or access 
roads from the primary right of way to permanent structures. 
F. No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing materials; the 
intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
G. All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) years 
of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings constructed on 
the parcel from raw building materials. 
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R Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design 
to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
I. No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
J. The exterior of ar1y structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed with:L.1 one 
year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of construction, the 
o\VTier shall cause foe premises to be kept free and clear of debris and waste matter 
and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to be disposed of in a proper 
manner so that the same imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 
K. ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be placed, 
kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restnct10ns and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to enforce such 
terms. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with 
the said Grantees that he is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that they are liee from all 
encumbrances except those set forth above, and taxes, levies and assessments for 2002 and 
thereafter; and that he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Granter has hereunto set his hand and seal this · 2-!0 -ti:, 
day of March, 2002. 
GRAN TOR: 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS 
County of Nez Perce ) 
On this ~day of March, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Nota.yr Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, personally appeared JACK W. CRIDLEBAUGH, knoVvn or identified to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing h'1Strument at1d acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day 
and year :first above written. 
My commission expires ~ -2? ~ 7 C:Vc'.l Y. 
-4-
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PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT 
John and Carol 
j( . 
You certainly must be thriiied to see the building of your dream home 
coming into the final stages of assembly, as you approach the day 
that you too, get to move in and start enjoying the peace, quiet, 
seclusion, and enjoyment of country living here on the mountain. 
With winter quickly approaching and the beauty of the changing 
season, Audrey a~d I were reflecting back on how much we have 
enjoyed our past several years living here. Probable like yourselves, 
our dream has always been to live away from all the hustle-bustle of 
city living, and enjoy a slower pace of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, 
without all the noise, interruptions, and traffic associated with city 
living. So, with those thoughts still fresh in our minds, we wanted to 
again revisit the subject and previous conversations we have had 
regarding your use of our road. As you recall 1 during our initial 
discussions on this matter we granted you permission for construction 
access across our road and property to assist you and your 
contractors in having ready made access to your construction site. I 
think you would have to agree, that this construction access across 
our road and property has been most helpful in assisting you in a 
much timelier and substantially iess costly approach to the 
construction of your new home! As neighbors we were happy to 
assist you in this way, as we too know that at this elevation you have 
a considerably shorter construction window than down in town. 
While it appears that the majority of the construction of your new 
house is nearing completion, we know you still have some work that 
will likely be continuing over the next few months. As wintei is quickly 
approaching and ground freeze and snow are already making a 
showing of the transition into winter, we have decided for the time 
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you to gain construction access to your home by entering and exiting 
it across our road and property. As always, we expect you and your 
contractors to treat the road with respect, maintain a slow and 
reasonable speed; watch for our grandchildren and dogs at play, and 
promptly assist wlth maintenance and repairs as needed and 
As I stated above, Audrey and my dream has always been to live 
away from all the hustle-bustle of city living! and enjoy a slower pace 
of peaceful, quiet, semi-seclusion, without all the noise, interruptions, 
and traffic associated with city life. ObviousJy, lt is no surprise to 
either of us that this has not been the case since we. granted you 
construction access for the building of your new house. To put it 
frankfy1 the traffic;-not knowing who is coming and going, dust, dogs 
always barking at passing cars 1 and vehicles driving so close to our 
home is much more disturbing than we had ever anticipated; 
however, it is something that we have agreed to handle for a while 
longer and is truly the neighborly thing to do. 
As your major construction will be coming to an end in the next month 
· or so, we will be into the snowy freezing months of winter when 
outside work is almost impossible. Therefore, we don 1t feel it 
reasonable at this time to ask you to start building or using an 
alternate access route to your home, rather than the construction 
route you have been using across our road and property. However, 
you need to start planning now on upgrading your initial and legal 
access road to your home, such that any required construction or 
upgrade work on it can commence as soon as spring weather allows. 
Even with a late spring, there is no reason for you to not have your 
own access road to your new home completed by the end of June 
2008. This gives you eight months to plan and obtain any needed 
permissions, permits, contractors, materials, or any other items that 
may be needed for the timely completion of your own road. 
Therefore, Audrey and I have agreed that your construction access to 
your home across our road and property will terminate as soon as 
your road is completed, and under no circumstances later than June 3~1 
PL~f~, AMENDED COMPLAINT EXHIBIT 
We feel as neighbors we have been very fair and patient in providing 
you construction access; however1 .as you know, it was never 
intended to be anything more than temporary for the purposes of 
construction, The removal of all outside traffic going across our 
pl8G8 a!!ov1s us both to get on with our Hves and pursue our priorities. 
11~.;;; 
_f J;.., ; ' 
For us, no longer having outside traffic across our road and property 
allows us to moni1or and control the access and security of our roadl 
property, and dwellings. 
I hope you donlt find this letter to be a surprise or harsh) as neither 
are our intent. W~ are neighbors and we feel we have been and are 
continuing to do ths right and neighborly thing, otherwise we would 
have never agreed to your construction access in the beginning. We 
just want to communicate this to you in writing to insure you clearly 
understand our position and timeline on the matter of your use of our 
road, and for everyone's safety, security, and overall well being that 
your use must come to an end in the not to distant future. If you have 
any questions or there is any portion of this letter that you don't 
understand please feel free to give us a call or drop by. 
Best Regards/ 
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W. JEREMY CARR 
Idaho State Bar No. 6829 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Defendants Vance 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCH a..11d CA.I~DLE D. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY 




) CASE NO. CV 08-2272 
) 
) 
) ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' 







COMES NOW the Defendants, ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, and answers Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint filed in the above-entitled matter as follows: 
1. Defendants deny all allegations contained in the Amended Complaint unless 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 through 16 of the 
Amended Complaint. 
3. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 17 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM 1 LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 








5. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 through 24 of the 
























6. Defendants admit paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Amended Complaint. 
7. Defendants deny paragraphs 27 through 45 of the Amended Complaint. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, the defendants do complain and allege as follows: 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Counterclaim seeks declaratory relief as well as a claim for trespass and attorney fees. 
The underlying subject matter of this Counterclaim is real property owned by the defendants and 
adjacent real property owned by the plaintiffs located in Nez Perce County, State ofldaho. 
II. 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carolee D. Hoch are husband and wife. 
2. Defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance are husband and wife. 
3. Defendants Rob Vance and Becky Vance are the owners of certain real property 
situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho more particularly described as follows: 
The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements for ingress and egress running from public right-
of-way to the above described real property which are appurtenances to said real 
property. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
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RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real 
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement 
over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 








No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's 
written consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give 
as long as he owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (El/2NW1/4) and the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest of the Northeast Quarter 
(NW1/4SW1/4NE1/4) all located in Section 22, Township 33 North, 
Range 4, West of the Boise Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) 
years after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOT be 
utilized as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction 
shall not apply during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED 
this restriction waiver shall not exceed one (1) year; 
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, 
nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance 
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet 
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners. 
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to 
remain on the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not 
prohibit the temporary use of heavy construction equipment for the 
preparation of building sites or access roads from the primary right of way 
to permanent structures. 
No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing 
materials; the intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four (4) 
years of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings 
constructed on the parcel from raw buildi:rig materials. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
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H. Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standings garages, shall be similar 





No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed 
within one year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of 
construction, the owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of 
debris and waste matter and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to 
be disposed of in a proper manner so that the same imposes no interference 
or detraction to adjoining property. 
ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be 
placed, kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to 
enforce such terms. 
SUBJECT TO Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and 
CaroleYN J. TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGUE, 
recorded March, 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO aneasementforaperpetualright-of-wayincidental thereto as set forth 
in a document to DALE R. TURNER and Carole YN J. TURNER, husband ffi1d wife, 
JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK and BETTY 
L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, recorded July 29, 1997 
as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental 
thereto as set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622760, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO an easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental 
thereto as set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMP ANY, 
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
4. Plaintiffs John Hoch and Carole Hoch are the owners of certain real property situate 
in the County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho more particularly described as follows: 
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The West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in 







Perpetual Easement by and between DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, and RANDALL P. RUCKDASHEL and 
KAREN RAE RUCKDASHEL, husband and wife, and MIKE McHARGlJE, 
recorded March, 21, 1995 as Instrument No. 596083, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
Easement for a perpetual right-of-way incidental thereto as set forth in a 
document to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. TURNER, husband and 
wife, JACK CRIDLEBAUGH, an unmarried man, and TERRY A. CLACK 
and BETTY L. CLACK, Trustees of the Clack Family Revocable Trust, 
recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 622759, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to DALE R. TURNER and CaroleYN J. 
TURNER, husband and wife, recorded July 29, 1997 as Instrument No. 
622760, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
Easement for the purpose of public utilities and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a document granted to CLEARWATER POWER COMPANY, 
recorded January 26, 1998 as Instrument No. 628290, records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as set forth in a document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 
657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto 
as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
SUBJECT TO the following Restrictive Covenants: 
A. No parcel shall be subdivided into smaller parcels without the Grantor's 
written consent, which written consent Grantor shall not be required to give 
as long as he owns any portion of the following described real property: 
The East Half of the Northwest Quarter (El/2NW1/4) and the Northwest 
Quarter of the Southwest of the Northeast Quarter (NW1/4SW1/4NE1/4) all 
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located in Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4, West of the Boise 
Meridian. 
This Restriction shall terminate and be of no further force or effect five (5) 
years after the date this Warranty Deed is recorded. 
Temporary structures, such as utility trailers or 5th wheelers shall NOT be 
utilized as residences, or storage facilities, on the property. This restriction 
shall not apply during the construction of permanent dwellings, PROVIDED 
this restriction waiver shall not exceed one (1) year; 
No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, 
nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance 
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet 
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners. 
Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
No logging trucks or heavy construction equipment shall be allowed to 
remain on the premises more than 36 consecutive hours. This shall not 
prohibit the temporary use of heavy construction equipment for the 
preparation of building sites or access roads from the primary right of way 
to permanent structures. 
No unpainted corrugated or galvanized metal may be used for roofing 
materials; the intent of this restriction being to minimize glare. 
All buildings must either be manufactured homes constructed within four ( 4) 
years of the date said manufactured home is placed on the lot, or buildings 
constructed on the parcel from raw building materials. 
Outbuilding, such as barns, shops or free-standings garages, shall be similar 
in design to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
No fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way. 
The exterior of any structure, resident or outbuildings shall be completed 
within one year of obtaining proper building permits. During the period of 
construction, the owner shall cause the premises to be kept free and clear of 
debris and waste matter and shall cause all such debris and waste matter to 
be disposed of in a proper manner so that the same imposes no interference 
or detraction to adjoining property. 
ANIMALS: No animals except dogs, cats, other household pets may be 
placed, kept, bred or maintained on the premises. 
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L. REMEDIES. Either Grantor or Grantees may enforce the restrictions and 
conditions set forth above; however, neither party shall be obligated to 
enforce such terms. 
ill. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. Defendants' and Plaintiffs' properties are adjacent to each other and share a common 
boundary. The location of this boundary is in dispute. 
6. Defendants and Plaintiffs both purchased their properties from Jack Cridlebaugh. 
Defendants and both parties were notified at time of sale that no real survey was performed, as noted 
in Perpetual Right of Way Easement #622759. 
7. Approximately in the summer of 2005 the Plaintiffs began constructing a home on 
their property. Defendants discussed with Plaintiffs on many occasions, prior to Plaintiffs starting 
construction on their property, the need to have a survey done so the Plaintiffs would not build on 
Defendants' property. Plaintiffs refused to have a survey done and began construction on their home 
crowding the edge of the Defendants property and in some instances building onto Defendants' 
property, and excavating and removing trees located on Defendant's property. Plaintiffs actions 
were without regard to Defendants rights to their property. 
8. Approximately in 2005 the Plaintiffs' and their agents began driving across 








9. On or about July 2008 Defendants' had Cuddy & Associates perform a survey on the 
boundary lines of the parties adjacent property lines. A copy of the survey is marked as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
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10. On or about August 23, 2008, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a written demand letter 
requesting they cease and desist their construction activities on Defendants' property. Plaintiffs 
John and Carole Hoch still refuse to cease and desist their construction activities on Defendants' 
property. Further, Plaintiffs have failed to remove their property from Defendants' real property 
despite repeated request by Defendant. 
IV. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
11. Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations. 
12. At all times mentioned Defendants were, and now are, the owners in fee simple of 
the aforementioned real estate described above under a deed of conveyance. 
13. As a consequence of the Plaintiffs aforementioned acts, Plaintiffs contest the true 
location of the boundary line. All of the above named Plaintiffs, known and unknown, claim an 
interest in the property adverse to Defendant's undivided fee simple interest in said real property. 
Plaintiffs' claims are without any right whatever and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or 
interest in or to Defendants' undivided interest in fee simple to said property, or any part thereof. 
14. The above described claims of the Plaintiffs constitute a cloud on Defendants' title 
and prevent Defendants from the complete enjoyment and use of said property. As a further 
consequence of such acts of the Plaintiffs, some of the real property that is owned by Defendants 
is out of the possession of the Defendants and in possession of the Plaintiffs, to the injury of the 
Defendants. 
15. The Court should declare that the survey line is the boundary line of the parties 
property and declare Defendants as the owner in fee of the premises in question to the exclusion of 
the Plaintiffs. Further, the Court should issue a permanent injunction enjoining Plaintiffs from 
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interfering with Defendants use of the aforementioned property, including but not limited to 
enjoining Plaintiffs' from driving across Defendants' property. 
v. 
TRESPASS 
16. Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations. 
17. From July 2, 2009, to the present, Plaintiffs and their agents, and employees, 
knowingly and willfully entered onto Defendants' land, and without legal right and without the 
Defendants' knowledge or consent, willfully and intentionally engaged in excavation, and engaged 
in construction activities, including the construction of permanent structures, and causing 
construction debris on Defendants' land. Said Plaintiffs converted the removed trees for their own 
use. 
18. Plaintiffs and their agents, employees, knowingly built a road across and drove across 
the southern portion of Defendants' land without legal right and without Defendants' knowledge or 
consent, willfully and intentionally. 
19. Plaintiffs, and their agents and employees, knowingly trespassed on Defendants' 
property and caused construction debris to accumulate on Defendants' property. 
20. By reason of the above acts, Defendants sustained both general and special damages. 
VI. 
BREACH OF RESTRICTNE COVENANTS 
21. Defendants reallege all foregoing allegations. 
22. Plaintiffs are in violation of the Restrictive Covenants J and D contained in the 
above-referenced Warranty Deed(s) in that the Plaintiffs have left litter and/or construction debris 
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on the property and have caused or allowed construction to accumulate on Defendants' property and 
failed to complete the construction in the allotted time. 
23. By reason of the above acts, Defendants sustained both general and special damages. 
VI 
ATTORNEY FEES 
24. As a further and direct consequence of Plaintiffs' actions, the Defendants have been 
required to retain W. Jeremy Carr of the law firm of CLARK and FEENEY, to prosecute this action. 
Defendants are entitled to recover their costs and fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 
and Idaho Code§ 6-202. 
VII. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully pray for relief and for judgment against the 
Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For an order restraining Plaintiffs and their agents, servants, employees, guests, 
invitees and others acting under their direction and authority during the pendency ofthis action, and 
thereafter permanently, from entering Defendants' premises and from interfering in any way with 
Defendants' possession, use and enjoyment of the property, or from accessing or driving across 
their property and from violating the restrictive covenants. 
2. For damages against the Plaintiffs on all causes of action alleged herein in an amount 
to be proven at trial, which amount is expected to well exceed $10,000.00; 
3. For an order requiring the Plaintiffs' to remove the items they placed on Defendants' 
property and to restore the property to its natural appearance. 
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4, That the Court adjudge and decree that Defendants are the owners in fee of the real 
property and that Defendants are in possession and entitled to possession of the real property, and 
retain jurisdiction to enforce the decree, 
5, For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred in this action, 
6. For s~ch oilier and furtliQ;f as 1he Court deems reasonable and just. 
DATED thisd rfrday of , 2010. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
By!t2~ 
w.~emy~ 
Attorney for Defendants Vance 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
BECKY VANCE, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That she is one of the Defendants above named, that she has read the foregoing complaint, 
and the contents thereof and the facts 'te therein are true to the best of her knowledge, 
information and belief. j ~ v:::., 
--':.-.rz..&~~-~~.Lfr~~---------~ 
BECKYV CE 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, this 1J3l!aay of UUJy 
\ 
'2010. 
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!40 Public in and for the State ofldaho 
R'esiding at Lewiston, therein. 
My commission expires:-'?;'-"-:"""'7·._l),__-·'""'l G_n _______ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the }JJ_1'-aay of~ 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the et od indicated below, and addressed to the 
2 
following: 
3 Theodore 0. Creason D U.S. Mail 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl ~ Hand Delivered 4 
1219 Idaho Street D Overnight Mail 
5 PO Drawer 835 D Telecopy 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
6 
Edwin L. Litteneker D U.S. Mail 
7 Attorney at Law ~ Hand Delivered 
PO Box 321 D Overnight Mail 
8 322 Main St. D Telecopy 
9 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
/ 
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LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 321 
3 22 Main Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-0344 
Facsimile: (208) 798-8387 
ISB No. 2297 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 


















COME NOW Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet, wife and husband, by and 
through their attorney of record, Edwin L. Litteneker and answers the Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint and Counterclaims against the Plaintiff's as follows: 
1. Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet admit paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 
11, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
2. Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet deny paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18 
19- 45 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 
SEC01'1]) AFFIR"J\1.ATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any interest in the property of the 
Defendants Sweet. 
TIDRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs have proceeded in this matter with unclean hands and are not entitled to 
the equitable remedy sought herein. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' have failed to name indispensable parties. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' claim is :frivolous. 
The Defendants Sweets reserve the right to add parties, claims, or defenses based upon 
discovery in this matter. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet do 
complain and allege as follows: 
1. Parties. 
1.1 Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are husband and wife. 
1.2 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are husband and wife. 
1.3 Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are owners of certain real 
property situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly 
described as follows: 
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The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
1.4 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are owners of certain real 
property situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly 
described as follows: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
2. Factual Allegations. 
2.1 Sweet has constructed at their sole expense a roadway commencing at 
Stage Coach Road and proceeding in a Southeasterly direction, then east which 
ends at their residence. 
2.2 Such roadway was constructed by Sweet's sole expense and provision of 
labor, contracted labor and the purchase of materials necessary to build the 
roadway. 
2.3 Such roadway did not exist prior to Sweet's construction of the roadway. 
2.4 Hoch has constructed a residence on the real property owned by them. In 
connection with the construction of the home, excavation occurred which resulted 
in excess material excavation from Hoch's excavation being deposited on Sweet's 
property. 
3. Trepass. 
3.1 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing 
allegations. 
3.2 In approximately July of 2004 without permission from the Sweet's, 
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Hoch, their agents or employees deposited rock on the Sweet's property. 
3.3 Such rock remains located on the Sweet property without Sweet's 
permission and is a continuing trespass. 
3.4 Such rock continues to affect the use of the Sweet property. 
3.5 Sweet is damaged by the rock being deposited on Sweet's property by 
Hoch. 
4. Unjust Enrichment. 
4.1 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing 
allegations. 
4.2 If such roadway is determined to be real property within which Hoch has 
an interest, the real property of sweet was improved to its present 
condition without any contribution, participation or expense by Hoch. 
4.3 Should Hoch be entitled to use such improvements as constructed by 
Sweet, Hoch and Hoch' s real property interest are unjustly enriched by the 
actions of Sweet. 
4.4 Hoch should compensate Sweet in an amount to be determined by the 
Court based upon the expenses, costs, labor and materials incurred by 
Sweet to improve the real property interest of Hoch. 
3. Attorney Fees. The Defendants, Jake and Audrey Sweet have engaged the services of 
the undersigned in the defense and pursuant of this matter and have incurred attorney fees and 
costs. Such fees and costs should be paid by the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120, 
Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho Code§ 45-612, and LC.§ 6-202. 
WHEREFORE Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet pray for relief as follows: 
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1. That the Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as it relates to the 
Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet. 
2. That the Court deny any injunction or restraint of Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweets' 
future actions. 
3. That Hoch be required to remove such rock placed on Sweet's property without 
permission by Hoch. 
4. That Sweet receive damages for Roch's trespass and unjust enrichment as the Court 
may determine appropriate. 
5. An award of attorney fees and costs to the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet. 
6. For other such relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 2_ day of August, 2010. 
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Edwin L. Litteneker 
Attorney at Law 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states 
as follows: 
We are one of the about named defendants named herein. We have read the 
foregoing document and know the contents thereof and the fact~ therein are true to 
the best of our knowledge. Q~ 
-J~~e~w.-<-'ee~t--'~~~~~~~~-
g~ 





NOTARY PUBLI in and for the State ofldaho. 
Residing at fu ~~ 1 
My Comm. Exp ~ · ~\ · 1-t)\~ 
6 
3SO 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was: 
___L_ mailed by regular first class mail, 
and deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
__ sent by facsimile 
__ sent by Federal Express, overnight 
delivery 
hand delivered 
To: Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lev.7iston, ID 83501 
on this l day of August, 2010. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
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FILED 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB# 1563 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
Wll> F0J 1 l Pl) 9 31 
utif~;J~YVJ ~ P.O. Drawer 835 Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 f<: ;' -;- ; 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. 
HOCH, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. CVOS-2272 
) 











For answer to defendant Vances' Counterclaim, the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and 
Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS IN COUNTERCLAIM 
1. As to the allegations set forth in defendant Vances' Counterclaim, the 
plaintiffs deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
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2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1. 
3. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 2. 
4. Plaintiffs admit that defendants, Rob Vance and Becky Vance, are the 
owners of a parcel of real property described as "the East Half of the Northeast Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise 
Meridian." The plaintiffs deny that the remaining allegations set forth in paragraph 3 
describe the property owned by the defendants Vance. 
5. Plaintiffs admit the allegation set forth in paragraph 4 that the plaintiffs are 
the owners of a parcel of real property described as "the West Half of the Northeast Quarter 
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise 
Meridian." Plaintiffs deny that the foregoing description is a complete and accurate 
description of their property. Plaintiffs further deny that the remaining allegations set forth 
in paragraph 4 describe the property owned by the plaintiffs. 
6. Plaintiffs admit the allegation in paragraph 5 that plaintiffs' property is 
adjacent to defendant Vances' property and that the two parcels share a common boundary. 
Plaintiffs deny that the location of the common boundary is in dispute. 
7. Plaintiffs admit that before purchasing their property, they were notified that 
no survey had been performed. Plaintiffs are without sufficient knowledge to admit or 
deny whether defendants Vance were notified at the time of sale that no survey had been 
performed. 
8. Plaintiffs admit that they began constructing a home on their property in the 
summer of 2005 and that they discussed obtaining a survey with the defendants Vance. 
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Plaintiffs deny the remammg allegations set forth m paragraph 7 of the defendants' 
Counterclaim. 
9. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 8. 
10. Plaintiffs admit the allegations contained in paragraph 9. 
11. Plaintiffs lack sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the allegation set forth 
in paragraph 10 of the defendants' Counterclaim alleging that the defendants sent plaintiffs 
a written demand letter. Plaintiffs deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 
10. 
12. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 11 to the extent it 
incorporates allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs. 
13. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 12. 
14. Plaintiffs deny the allegation set forth in paragraph 13. 
15. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 14. 
16. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 15. 
17. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 16 to the extent it 
realleges allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs. 
18. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 17. 
19. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 18. 
20. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 19. 
21. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 20. 
22. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 21 to the extent it 
realleges allegations previously denied by the plaintiffs. 
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23. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 22. 
24. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 23. 
25. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 24. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
As affirmative defenses, the plaintiffs allege and state: 
1. Defendant V ances' Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
2. The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 
3. The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. 
4. The defendants' Counterclaim is barred by accord and satisfaction and/or 
under the doctrine of lac hes. 
5. Defendants previously released the plaintiffs from any liability stemming 
from the allegations raised in the defendants' Counterclaim. 
6. The defendants acted with unclean hands and are not entitled to equitable 
relief. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed, that 
defendants take nothing thereby, that the plaintiffs be awarded their costs incurred herein, 
including attorney fees, and that plaintiffs be granted such other and further relief as the 
Court may deem warranted. 
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DATED this 11th day of August, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
?kduf:JG~ 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
John and Carole Hoch 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of August, 2010, a copy of the foregoing 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT V ANCES' COUNTERCLAIM was served by the method 
indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Ed win L. Li tteneker 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 321 
322 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P. 0. Drawer 285 
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For answer to defendant Sweets' Counterclaim, the plaintiffs, John M. Hoch and 
Carole D. Hoch, husband and wife, admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
RESPONSES TO ALLEGATIONS IN COUNTERCLAIM 
1. As to the allegations set forth in defendant Sweets' Counterclaim, the 
plaintiffs deny all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT SWEETS' 
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2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.1. 
3. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.2. 
· 4. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.3. 
5. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1.4. 
6. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.1. 
7. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.2. 
8. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 2.3. 
9. Plaintiffs admit that they have constructed a residence on real property 
owned by them as alleged in paragraph 2.4. Plaintiffs deny the remaining allegations set 
forth in paragraph 2.4. 
10. Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained in paragraph 3 .1 to the extent it 
realleges facts already denied by the plaintiffs. 
11. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3 .2. 
12. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.3. 
13. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.4. 
14. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 3.5. 
15. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.1 to the extent it 
realleges facts already denied by the plaintiffs. · 
16. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.2. 
17. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.3. 
18. Plaintiffs deny the allegations set forth in paragraph 4.4. 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
As affirmative defenses, the plaintiffs allege and state: 
1. Defendant Sweets' Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
2. The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. 
3. The defendants' Counterclaim is barred under the doctrine of laches. 
4. The defendants acted with unclean hands and are not entitled to equitable 
relief. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand that defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed, that 
defendants take nothing thereby, that the plaintiffs be awarded their costs incurred herein, 
including attorney fees, and that plaintiffs be granted such other and relief as the Court may 
deem warranted. 
DATED this 1 lth day of August, 2010. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
a~~~ 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
John and Carole Hoch 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of August, 2010, a copy of the foregoing 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT SWEETS' COUNTERCLAIM was served by the method 
indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Edwin L. Litteneker x FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
Attorney at Law HAND DELIVERED 
P. 0. Box 321 OVERNIGHT MAIL 
3 22 Main Street FAX TRANSMISSION 
Lewiston, ID 83501 798-8387 
W. Jeremy Carr x FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
Clark and Feeney HAND DELIVERED 
1229 Main Street OVERNIGHT MAIL 
P. 0. Drawer 285 FAX TRANSMISSION 
Lewiston, ID 83501 746-9160 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB # 1563 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANT SWEETS' 
COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
toc/hoch _j ohnlpleadings/answer-sweet 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston ID 83501 
(208)743-1516; Fax (208)746-2231 
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CASE NO. CV 08-2272 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Tiris case comes before me on the Hochs's motion for judgment on the pleadings based 
on claim preclusion. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 2, 2009, the Hochs and Vances settled various property claims against each other 
through a mediation agreement. On July 13, 2009, pursuant to that agreement, all of the 
V ances' s previously asserted counterclaims were dismissed with prejudice. 
However, new disagteements have arisen, and, on June 23, 2010, the Hochs filed an 
Amended Complaint. In response, the Vances answered and counterclaimed, asserting trespass 
. and breach of restrictive covertCll1ts claims, ru1d asking for a declaratory judgment establishing the 
boundru·y line between the parties' properties. The Hoclis now move for judgtnent on the 
pleadings concerning those counterclaims. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
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II. CONTENTIONS 
The Hochs assert that all of the Vances's current counterclaims mirror their prior 
counterclaims that were dismissed with prejudice. The Hoc11S therefore contend that the V ances 
should be precluded from asserting their counterclaims. Further, the Hochs also contend that it is 
frivolous to assert claims identical to those previously dismissed with prejudice, and therefore the 
Vances's lawyer, 11r. Carr, has violated LR.C.P. § 11, and should be liable for the reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred to bring this motion. 
The Vances did not present any argument to justify the asse1iion of the breach of 
rest:Iictive covenants claim. As to the trespass claim, the Vances contend that it is not precluded 
because it asserts acts of trespass occurring after the date of settlement; and after the date of 
dismissal. Concerning the claim for a declaratory judgment, the Vances contend that it is 
necessary to reassert that claim because the judgment establishing the property boundary was 
never filed as it should have been, pursuant to the settlement agreement. 
III. ST Al\TDARD OF REVIEW 
When an I.R.C.P. § 12(c) motion is decided on evidence in addition to the pleadings, the 
court must treat and dispose of the motion as one for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. § 56. 
Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 273 (1977) (citing Cookv. Saltman, 96 Idaho 187, 
188 (1974), disagreed with on other grounds by Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 643-44 (1976)). 
Because I consider the Hochs's.exhibits, in addition to the pleadings, I must decide this motion 
as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together vvith the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P. § 56(c). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION MTD ORDER - 2 
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Furthermore, this court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, G 
& Ai Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. The Vances's Claim for Declaratory Judgment is Precluded Because it is Identical to one 
Previously Dismissed With Prejudice. 
A claim is certainly precluded when it is identical to one previously asserted but 
dismissed with prejudice. See Km.vai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614 (1992) 
(citing Diamond v. Farmers Ins., 119 Idaho 146, 148 (1990)). In this case, the Vances's 
counterclaim asking for a·declaratory judgment is an exact copy of the claim for declaratory 
14!004/009 
judgment that was previously dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, the facts relied on are the 
same. Therefore, the current declaratory judgment claim is precluded. 
B. The Vimces's Claim of Breach of Restrictive Covenants is Partially Precluded Because it 
Arose out of the Sarne "Transaction of Series of Transactions" as the Claims Previously 
Dismissed. 
A claim need not be identical to one previously dismissed in order for preclusion to 
apply. Rather, all claims are precluded that arise out of the "same transaction or series of 
transactions" as claims previously dismissed. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 
150 (1990). 
The V ances'-s claim of breach of restrictive covenants asserts in part that the Hochs are in 
violation of a covenant requiring that all construction of buildings be completed within one year. 
-----.·- .. AJthoughtheVancests did not assert this violation in th~ir prior, dismissed, claim, they_.did 
assert other harms in connection with the Hochs's construction activities, and that the Hochs 
began construction of their home in 2005. Therefore, the violation of the covenant was present at 
the time of the dismissal and was part of the same transaction making up the Vances' s prior 
claims: constmction activities by the Hochs. Thus, the part of the Vances's current claim for 
1v1EMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
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breach of covenants based on taldng more than one year to construct a building is precluded. 
The Vances's claim of breach of restrictive covenants also asse1is that the Hochs have 
violated restTictions requiring that all parcels be kept "clean and attractive" and "free and clear of 
debris." This portion of the claim asserts that, due to the Hochs's construction activities, the 
Hochs's property is untidy, in violation of the restrictions. 
Again, this claim arises out of the same transaction as the dismissed claims: the Hochs's 
construction activities. However, there is an exception to the "same transaction" rule where the 
claimant did not know, nor should have known, the facts supporting a claim arising from the 
same transaction. See Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614 (1992). It is unclear 
in this case whether or not the clutter complained of existed prior to the dismissal. If not, then 
the Vances could not have k:novm of the facts supporting their claim, and the claim would not be 
precluded. Because I must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Vances, I 
must conclude that the trash complained of is not any that was present prior to the previous 
dismissal. Therefore, claim preclusion does not bar the V ances's claim of breach of restrictive 
covenants so far as it is based on the untidiness of the Hochs' s property. 
C. The Vances 's Trespass Claim is not Precluded Because it is Based 011 Facts Arising After 
the Dismissal 
The V ances' s trespass claim mirrors the claim previously dismissed, except that it states 
that the acts of trespass occurred from July 2, 2009 (the date of the mediation agreement) to the 
present. All Of the alleged trespasses are related to the Hochs' s construction activities, and 
therefore arise out of the same transaction or occunence as the V ances' s dismissed claims. 
However, the V ances' s counsel stated in oral argument on this motion that the general allegations 
in their statement of their tresp3;Ss claim are meant to allege that, since the time of the mediation 
agreement and dismissal, the Hochs have deposited new construction debris in new locations on 
l\1EMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
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the Vances's property and have driven vehicles across new parts of the Vances's property that the 
Hochs have no legal right to cross. Because I must draw all inferences in favor of the Vances, I 
must infer that the language of the current trespass claim is meant to allege trespassory acts not 
occun-ing prior to the dismissal of the Vances's prior claims. The Vances's trespass claim is 
therefore not precluded, as it facts occurring after the dismissal. 
D. llfr. Carr is Li<lblefor Rule 11 Sanctions.for Asserting the Claimfor Declaratory Relief. 
LR. C.P. § 11 calls for the imposition of sanctions against the one signing a pleading if a 
claim is brought to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation." In this case, I can see no other purpose in the assertion of the claim for declaratory 
relief other than to retaliate by increasing the Hochs's litigation costs. 
The claim is identical to one previously dismissed with prejudice. In their "Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," the Vances argued, without submitting any 
evidence, that the basis of all of their counterclaims was that the Hochs were not in compliance 
with the Mediation Agreement. Even assuming this explanation as fact, it is not a justification 
for the request for a declaration as to the location of the property boundary. So, at oral argument, 
Mr. Carr had created a new justification: due to an oversight by himself, an agreed order as to the 
property boundary had not been filed since the agreement. Although this may be a justification 
for why an order as to the location of the property boundary is justified, it is not a justification for 
re-asserting a previously dismissed claim. Mr. Can simply needed to contact the Hochs's 
counsel and request that they agree to an order establishing the property line agreed to in 
mediation. 
Because Mr. Carr is the one who signed the answer and counterclaim, he is liable. As 
only one of the three claims in this case was brought for an improper purpose, sanctions are 
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limited to one-111ird of the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the Hochs to bring this motion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Vances's claim for declaratory judgment is precluded because an identical claim was 
previously dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, their claim for breach of the restrictive 
covena11t requiring that construction activities be.completed within a year is precluded because it 
arises from the same transaction as previously dismissed claims: the Hochs's construction 
activities. However, the claims of trespass and breach of the restrictive covenant requiring 
premises be kept free of construction debris are not precluded. Although both are related to the 
same transaction as claims previously dismissed, they both asse1t facts occurring after the 
dismissal, and therefore preclusion does not apply. 
The claim for declaratory judgment was brought without any discernible purpose other 
than to increase the costs of litigation. Therefore, Mr. Carr, as the signatory to the Vances's 
answer and counterclaim, is liable to the Hochs for the attorneys' fees that can be attributed to 
defending the declaratory judgment counterclaim: one-third of the total incurred in bringing the 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
VI. ORDER 
For the reasons stated above, the Hochs's motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
GRANTED as to the Vances's claim for declaratory relief. The Hochs's motion for judgment on 
the pleadings is GRANTED as to the Vances's claim of a violation of restrictive covenants by 
taking more than one year to complete construction. The Hochs's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings is DENIED as to the Vances's claim of a violation of restrictive covenants by not 
keeping the Hoch property free of construction debris. The Hochs's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings is DENIED as to the Vances's claim of trespass. Mr. W. Jeremy Can is ordered to pay 
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to the Hochs one-third of the fees incurred in bringing their motion. 
ITIS SO ORDERED, this the~~p-010 
14Joo1/001 
------- ------------------------------- ----- --- ------ - ---------------------------- ------ -- --- -- -- --- --------------- ---- - ----- ,-------- -- -- --
MEMORANDUM: DECISION AND ORDER - 7 36 7 
•< • --··-
It·=-:.:.::;:;:_ ... • z ._-T~£·~·.._•_: ~"-~-~.::-•;.•_,_•.:.•.:::,_.;,_~. '• --;: 
l 0/25/2010 MON 14: 0 9 FAX 2 0 8 4 7 6 0 CLEARWATER CO COURT ~~~ Nezperc unty Dist Ct [4i009/009 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, a Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that a copy 
of this document was mailed or deliveted on the _d_~ay of O<b~f, 2010 to the following 
persons: 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
The Train Station, Ste. 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho Street 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
322 Main St. 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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JAKE S\VEET and AUDREY SvVEET, ) 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and ) 
BECKY VANCE, husband and wife, ) 
Case No. CVOS-2272 
ORDER 
--- -····· -- .- .- --- ) ·- ----
Defendants. ) 
) 
The Stipulation of the parties dated November J1, 2010, having been filed 
herewith) the Court being fully apprised, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
OlWER - 1 
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1. The $1,000.00 currently owed by plaintiffs to defendants Vance, assessed 
against them by Judge John Stegne.r pursuant to the remediation agreement) and the 
$748.42 in attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs against defendants Vances' attorney, 
W. Jeremy Can, in relation to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for 
an Order to Dismiss the Counterclaim of Defendants Vance With Prejudice shall be offset 
by plajntiffs paying to defendants Vance the amount of $25158. 
2. Payment of the $251.58 by plaintiffs to defendants Vance constitutes a full 
and final resolution of the pending interlocutory assessments imposed. 
l(f 
DATED this l_!__ day ofNovember, 2010. 
\ 
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JOHN BRADBURY, DISTRICT JUP.GE 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I/ __ day of November, 2010, a copy of the 
foregou1g ORDER was served by the meirod indicated below and addressed to the 
followim:: ..., 
Theodore O. Creason 
Creason> Moore1 Dokken 
& Geidl, PLLC 
1219 Idaho Street 
E..O. Drawer 83.S-
Le"viston, ID 83501 
Edwin L Litteneker 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box321 
322 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 















CASE NO. CV08-02272 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
LEA VE TO AMEND ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim. Plaintiffs Hoch were represented by attorney Theodore 0. Creason. Defendants 
Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were represented 
by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court, having read the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted 
by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, 
hereby renders its decision. 
Hoch v. Sweet, et al. 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch filed the above-entitled action 
seeking to enjoin Defendants Sweet and Vance from obstructing and blocking Plaintiffs' use of a 
road easement Plaintiffs contend they received within the deed to their property. Defendants 
Sweet filed an Answer denying Plaintiffs Hoch hold any property interest in Sweets' property, in 
particular denying Hochs hold a right of easement over Sweets' property. Defendants Vance 
filed an Answer and Courterclaim, asserting by way of Answer that Plaintiffs have no easement 
right upon Defendant Vances' property and by way of Counterclaim that the Court should 
declare the survey contracted for by Defendants Vance to be the true boundary between 
Plaintiffs' property and Defendant V ances' property and asserting a claim for trespass. 
However, early in the litigation, Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Vance resolved the issues 
re la ti ve to V ances' counterclaims and the parties stipulated to dismissal of the counterclaims 
with prejudice. 
Approximately one year after the filing of the above-entitled lawsuit, Plaintiffs Hoch 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Following a hearing on the Motion, the Court granted 
Plaintiffs summary judgment, finding the warranty deed for the property purchased by the Hochs 
provided them an easement right in what the parties refer to as the upper road but leaving for 
later determination the scope and location of the easement road. Plaintiffs subsequently sought 
to amend their Complaint to include claims for nuisance, trespass, breach of covenant, and 
assault, which the Court granted. Defendants Sweet filed an Answer and Counterclaims for 
declaratory judgment as to boundary lines, trespass and breach of restrictive covenants in 
response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Defendants Vance also filed an Answer and 
Counterclaims for declaratory judgment as to boundary lines, trespass and breach of restrictive 
2 
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covenants in response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs subsequently filed Answers 
to the Counterclaims filed by Defendants Sweet and Vance and sought dismissal of the 
Counterclaims of Defendants Vance based on the stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the 
Vances' counterclaims plead earlier in the litigation. Following a hearing on the issues, the 
Court dismissed the Vances' second claim for declaratory judgment and part of the Vances' 
breach ofrestrictive covenants claim but let the Vances' trespass claim stand. 
On July 12, 2011, Defendants Sweet filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim. Defendants Vance filed notice of non-opposition. However, Plaintiffs Hoch have 
filed a brief in opposition, assert the Motion is untimely, will result in delay and seeks to raise 
issues already decided in the Court's ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants Sweet seek to amend their Answer and Counterclaims to add a claim for 
declaratory judgment, asking the Court to find that I.C. § 55-313 allows the Sweets to 
unilaterally relocate the road that is Plaintiffs' easement. Idaho Code§ 55-313 reads: 
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication, 
has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the 
person or persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at 
their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but 
such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle 
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such 
access. 
In a recent Idaho Supreme Court ruling, the Court held that "the clear implication of LC. 
§ 55-313 is to allow for the relocation of an access road where such relocation does not injure 
interested parties - even where that road takes the form of an express easement - without the 
consent of the dominant estate holder(s)." Statewide Construction, Inc. v. Pietri, 150 Idaho 423, 
3 
Hoch v. Sweet. et al. 
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429, 247 P.3d 650, 656 (2011). The Court's recent ruling is significant to the issue raised by 
Defendants Sweet on Motion to Amend. 
In the instant matter, Judge Bradbury ruled that the warranty deed held by Plaintiffs Hoch 
provides them an easement for ingress and egress across the 'upper road' running upon 
Defendants Sweets' property. However, a number of issues remain to be determined in the 
litigation, including the location and scope of the easement road. The Court's ruling in Statewide 
Construction, Inc. v. Pietri and Defendant Sweets' notice of their intent to invoke rights they 
have under LC. § 55-313 may have significant impact on the final outcome in the litigation. 
Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy and the economic interests of the parties, the Court 
finds the application ofl.C. § 55-313 should be determined concurrent with the remaining 
matters in the litigation rather than in a separate action, as could occur. 
ORDER 
The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant Sweets' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim. 
Dated this /P day of August 2011. 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was: 
~d delivered via court basket, or 
__ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this l}_ day of August 
2011, to: 
Edwin L Litteneker 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID, 83501 
William Jeremy Carr 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID, 83501 
Theodore 0 Creason 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID, 83501 
PATTYO. WEEKS,CLERK. ----- - ., . '"-' 
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'I/ 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 321 
322 Main Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 746-0344 
Facsimile: (208) 798-8387 
ISB No. 2297 
Attorney for Defendant 
FlLED 
Wll {VG 19 ff) 2 22 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
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JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 














Case No. CV 08-2272 
AMENDED ANSWER TO 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
& COUNTERCLAIM 
COME NOW Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet, wife and husband, by and 
through their attorney of record, Edwin L. Litteneker and answers the Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint and Counterclaims against the Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet admit paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 
11, 13, 14, 25 and 26 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
2. Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet deny paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18 
19- 45 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
AMENDED ANSWER TO 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
& COUNTERCLAIM 1 
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FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any interest in the property of the 
Defendants Sweet. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff's have proceeded in this matter Vvith unclean hands and are not entitled to 
the equitable remedy sought herein. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' have failed to name indispensable parties. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' claim is frivolous. 
The Defendants Sweets reserve the right to add parties, claims, or defenses based upon 
discovery in this matter. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
As counterclaim against the Plaintiffs the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet do 
complain and allege as follows: 
1. Parties. 
1.1 Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are husband and wife. 
1.2 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are husband and wife. 
1.3 Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch are owners of certain real property 
situate in the County of Nez Perce, State ofidaho more particularly described as follows: 
The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official records of Nez Perce County, 
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Idaho. 
1.4 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet are owners of certain real property 
situate in the County of Nez Perce, State of Idaho more particularly described as follows: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce 
County, Idaho. 
2. Factual Allegations. 
2.1 Sweet has constructed at their sole expense a roadway commencing at Stage 
Coach Road and proceeding in a Southeasterly direction, then east which ends at their residence. 
2.2 Such roadway was constructed at Sweet's sole expense and provision of labor, 
contracted labor and the purchase of materials necessary to build the roadway. 
2.3 Such roadway did not exist prior to Sweet's construction of the roadway. 
2.4 Such roadway was constructed to service Sweet's residence in a manner 
convenient to Sweet's use of their property and the location of Sweet's residence. It was not 
intended by Sweet's to serve Roch's residence or to be used by Hoch to access Roch's property. 
2.5 Hoch has constructed a residence on the real property owned by them. In connection 
with the construction of the home, excavation occurred which resulted in excess excavation 
material from Roch's excavation being deposited on Sweet's property. 
3. Trepass. 
3 .1 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing allegations. 
3.2 In approximately July of 2004 without permission from the Sweet's, Hoch, their 
agents or employees deposited rock on the Sweet's property. 
3.3 Such rock remains located on the Sweet property without Sweet's permission and 
is a continuing trespass. 
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3 .4 Such rock continues to affect the use of the Sweet property. 
3.5 Sweet is damaged by the rock being deposited on Sweet's property by Hoch. 
4. Unjust Enrichment. 
4.1 Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet reallege all foregoing allegations. 
4.2 If such roadway is determined to be real property within which Hoch has an 
interest, the real property of sweet was improved to its present condition without any 
contribution, participation or expense by Hoch. 
4.3 Should Hoch be entitled to use such improvements as constructed by Sweet, Hoch 
and Hoch's real property interest are unjustly enriched by the actions of Sweet. 
4.4 Hoch should compensate Sweet in an amount to be determined by the Court based 
upon the expenses, costs, labor and materials incurred by Sweet to improve the real property 
interest of Hoch. 
5. Declaratory Judgment. 
5 .1. The Court shall declare that the route for Hoch' s access to their residence should be 
as generally illustrated in the attached Exhibit A. 
5.2 Such declaratory relief is not otherwise available to the Sweet's and no remedy at 
law is available. 
5.3 Such location of Roch's "access road" will provide adequate and appropriate access 
to Hoch's property across Sweet's property. 
6. Attorney Fees. The Defendants, Jake and Audrey Sweet have engaged the services of 
the undersigned in the defense and pursuant of this matter and have incurred attorney fees and 
costs. Such fees and costs should be paid by the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120, 
Idaho Code§ 12-121, Idaho Code§ 45-612, and LC. § 6-202. 
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WHEREFORE Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet pray for relief as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as it relates to the 
Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet. 
2. That the Court deny any injunction or restraint of Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweets' 
future actions. 
3. That Hoch be required to remove such rock placed on Sweet's property without 
permission by Hoch. 
4. That Sweet receive damages for Roch's trespass and unjust enrichment as the Court 
may determine appropriate. 
5. That the Roch's access road and corresponding easement be established as is 
illustrated in Exhibit A. 
6. An award of attorney fees and costs to the Defendants, Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet. 
7. For other such relief as the Court deems just and equi 
DATED this 11_ day of August, 2011. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states as 
follows: 
We are one of the about named defendants named herein. We have read the foregoing 
document and know the contents thereof and the facts stated thvr ·\~. r}:· ..• true to the best of our 
knowledge. )\) • 
!6_/ ~ ~-J;,-'-4--e-S-w~ee~t=--~~~~~~~~-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public on this\ i- day of August 
2011. 
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Residing at L ton 
My Comm. Exp 1\+.,,o.>-,_&-\,, o \ , '1...t>\S 
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/ 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was: 
_L mailed by regular first class mail, 
and deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
__ sent by facsimile 
__ sent by Federal Express, overnight 
delivery 
hand delivered 
To: Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl, PLLC 
P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
on this _fl_ day of August 2011. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECO 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORT 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 
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CASE NO. CV08-02272 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court for trial on December 12, 13, and 14, 2011. Plaintiffs 
Hoch were represented by attorneys Theodore 0. Creason and Samuel T. Creason. Defendants 
Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were represented 
by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court, having considered the record in this matter, the 
testimony presented, the arguments and exhibits submitted by the parties, the applicable law, and 
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
On October 21, 2008, Plaintiffs Hoch filed a Verified Complaint to Enjoin Defendants 
from Obstructing Easement after disputes arose between Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Sweets 
and V ances regarding road usage and easements. On October 28, 2008, Defendants Vance filed 
an Answer and Counterclaim along with a Lis Pendens filing against Plaintiffs property. On 
March 30, 2009, Defendants Sweet filed an Answer. On July 2, 2009, the parties entered into a 
mediation which resulted in a resolution being reached as to Defendant Vance's counterclaim, 
but did not result in a full resolution of the easement dispute. 
On October 21, 2009, Plaintiffs Hoch filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Motion was heard by District Judge John Bradbury, who is now retired. On December 23, 2009, 
Judge Bradbury entered his Memorandum Decision and Order, wherein he found: (a) Jack 
Cridlebaugh was the owner of ninety (90) acres of land in the Waha area; (b) Cridlebaugh sold 
twenty (20) acres to the Vances in 2000, forty (40) acres to the Sweets in 2001, and twenty (20) 
acres to the Hochs in 2002; and (c) Cridlebaugh retained ten (10) acres of the ninety acre parcel. 
Judge Bradbury then found language in the relevant deeds contained unambiguous language that 
granted an appurtenant easement on the "upper road" to Hochs and Sweets. Judge Bradbury, 
while granting the Hochs' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding conveyance of an easement 
to Hochs, specifically noted his ruling did not address the precise "route or scope" of the Hoch 
easement.1 
Following the Court's grant of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hochs 
sought, and the Court granted, leave to amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
1 Judge Bradbury's decision referenced the language in the Hoch warranty deed that conveyed Cridlebaugh's 
reservation of easement upon all existing roads and is, therefore, part of the determination to be made in determining 
the "route and scope" of the Hoch easement rights pursuant to their warranty deed. 
2 
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filed June 23, 2010, asserts claims for: (I) Nuisance; (II) Trespass; (III) Breach of Covenant; and 
(IV) Assault. On July 29, 2010, Defendants Vance filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaims, asserting counterclaims for: (A) Declaratory Judgment2; (B) Trespass; and (C) 
Breach of Restrictive Covenants. On August 4, 2010, Defendants Sweet filed an Amended 
Answer and Counterclaims, asserting counterclaims for: (A) Trespass; (B) Unjust Emichment; 
and (C) Declaratory Judgment. Each of the parties seeks attorney's fees in their pleadings. On 
July 12, 2011, Defendants Sweet moved to amend their Amended Answer and Counterclaims to 
add a claim for Declaratory Judgment, which was granted by the Court on August 10, 2011. 
Defendants Sweet Declaratory Judgment claim seeks the right to move the upper road easement 
pursuant to I. C. § 5 5-313. 
At trial, the Court heard from a number of witnesses, including Plaintiff John Hoch and 
Defendants Rob Vance, Audrey Sweet and Jake Sweet. The parties, understanding the Court's 
earlier ruling that found the deed from Jack Cridlebaugh to Plaintiffs Hoch granted Plaintiffs 
easement upon what the parties describe as the "upper road'', nevertheless dispute the scope and 
location of the upper road. At issue for this Court to determine is what constitutes a road and 
where upon the property the "upper road" existed at the time Cridlebaugh reserved and conveyed 
the appurtenant easement rights at issue. In discussing the roads at issue, the parties used the 
terms "upper road" and "lower road". There is no issue before the Court as to the "lower road" 
as defined by the parties. However, at issue for determination is the route or location of the 
"upper road" as that term is used by the parties. 
2 On Motion of Plaintiff, on October 25, 2010 Judge Bradbury dismissed Defendant Vances' counterclaim for 
Declaratory Judgment and Breach of Restrictive Covenants only as to the claim that construction had taken more 
than one year, but not as to construction debris left on the V ances' property. 
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In deposition3, Jack Cridlebaugh testified that when he sold property to the Vances, he 
gave them an easement right on the lower road only.4 When he sold to Sweets, he originally 
planned to give them easement rights on the lower road only but, after discussing the matter with 
them, decided to give them easement rights on both the lower and upper roads.5 Cridlebaugh 
further testified that when he sold property to the Hochs, his intent was to give them easement 
rights on the lower road only, as he had assured the Sweets he would not give anyone easement 
rights over the upper road without their approval.6 
Defendant Rob Vance testified that when he purchased his property from Jack 
Cridlebaugh in 2000, he was given easement rights on the "lower road" only. However, wanting 
a shorter access route to his property, Defendant Vance contacted adjacent landowner McKenna 
to discuss obtaining easement rights across his property via what is commonly referred to as 
Buckboard Lane. Defendant Vance testified Buckboard Lane was not part of the lower or upper 
Cridlebaugh road, but rather was barely more than a trail that ran in an east/west direction on the 
Vance and McKenna properties. After Vance obtained easement rights from McKenna, in 2002 
or 2003 he hired Willis Humphreys to build the road now known as Buckboard Lane, which runs 
east/west across the Vance and Mc Kenna properties and connects at the east end with 
Stagecoach Road7 and ends at the west end on the Vance property. 
Plaintiff John Hoch testified that in 2002, when he viewed the property he subsequently 
purchased, Cridlebaugh took him there by way of the lower road. When Plaintiff purchased the 
3 Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and as attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants 
Vance on November 23, 2009. 
4 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 30. 
5 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 24-25. 
6 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 25-32. 
7 Stagecoach Road is a county public road. However, Buckboard Lane, Black Bear Bend, and the roads referred to 
as the upper road and lower road are private roads. 
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property, it was his understanding that Cridlebaugh would only convey easement rights on the 
lower road. In 2005 Plaintiff Hoch spoke to Defendants Sweet about using the upper road to 
access his property, as it was a better route for construction crews who would be building a log 
home on the property. The Sweets agreed to Roch's use of the upper road, at least through the 
construction phase of Roch's home. However, by 2008, the Sweets informed Plaintiffs they 
could no longer use the upper road and, on several occasions, work crews attempting to get to the 
Hoch property by way of the upper road found their passage impeded because rocks, snow or 
equipment had been placed in the road. By this time, Hoch believed his deed included easement 
rights on both the lower and upper road and, when he was unable to reach an understanding with 
the Defendants, filed suit to resolve the easement dispute. The Court subsequently determined 
by the Court that Plaintiff Hoch had received easement rights in the upper road, but the ruling 
left for later determination a definition of the route and scope of the road. 
In addition to the testimony of witnesses at trial, the record contains the deposition 
transcript of Jack Cridlebaugh taken on April 15, 2009 and made part of the record on November 
19, 20098. In addition to the undisputed easement right Plaintiffs have on the lower road, 
Plaintiffs also claim their deed provides them easement rights on the upper road and on the 
section of Buckboard Lane that currently exists on the property of Defendants' Vance.9 The 
Court, in its summary judgment ruling, determined Plaintiffs deed conveyed ingress/egress 
easement rights on the upper road and also conveyed "an easement over and across all roadways 
presently existing on the property herein being conveyed"10 but left for later determination 
8 Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Jake & Audrey Sweet's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and as attached to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants 
Vance on November 23, 2009. 
9 Plaintiffs' theory is that the portion of Buckboard Lane that is on the Vance property was an extension or the upper 
road. 
10 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 105 and 106. 
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whether the road now known as Buckboard Lane was a road "presently existing" at the time 
Cridlebaugh conveyed to V ances the property they now own. 11 The testimony of Jack 
Cridlebaugh in his deposition is critical to the analysis ofthis issue. If the portion of Buckboard 
Lane that currently exists on the Vance property was a "roadway" at the time Cridlebaugh 
conveyed his property to the V ances, then it would fall within the reserved easement language in 
the Vance deed that was incorporated into the Hoch deed. If it was not a "roadway" at the time 
of conveyance to V ances, then Cridlebaugh had no easement reservation that would have 
transferred to Hochs. 
While the road easement issue is the primary issue in dispute, the parties have asserted a 
number of other claims and counterclaims. In support of those claims, the parties presented the 
Court with a number of photographs in support of their testimony regarding the various 
additional claims and counterclaims. Included among the photographs are pictures showing 
equipment, cattle guards, gates, and rock berms in the roadway. There are also pictures of 
construction debris, brush piles and a proposed new road. Each of the deeds received by the 
parties contains the same covenants and restrictions. At issue are the following covenants and 
restrictions: (a) each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner; (b) outbuildings, such 
as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in design to and compliment the 
structure constructed on the parcel; (c) no fences shall be built on the roads or rights-of-way; (d) 
no noxious, illegal or offensive activity, nor any activity that may become a nuisance to the 
neighborhood or may materially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each respective parcel 
owner; ( e) the exterior of any structure, residence or outbuildings shall be completed within one 
year of obtaining proper building permits; and (f) during the period of construction, the owner is 
11 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 107 at,if 5 and 6. 
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to keep the premises free and clear of debris and waste matter, disposing such in a manner that 
imposes no interference or detraction to adjoining property. 12 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(A) ROUTE AND SCOPE OF "UPPER ROAD" 
As previously stated, the Court has already determined that Plaintiffs Hoch have an 
easement right for ingress and egress on the "upper road" by way of conveyance in the warranty 
deed from Jack Cridlebaugh to the Hochs. 13 However, the Court left for later determination the 
route and scope of the "upper road". The evidence as to the route of the upper road is relatively 
undisputed. Jack Cridlebaugh testified in deposition that sometime in the late 90's he purchased 
ninety (90) acres in rural Nez Perce County in the area commonly known as Waha. 14 
Cridlebaugh stated that when he purchased the property there were two access roads, "the lower 
one off of Stagecoach and the upper one off of Stagecoach."15 Cridlebaugh then described the 
route of the "upper road" as leaving Stagecoach Road and going across the Carpenter property, 
then onto the Weinert property, then onto the ten acres still owned by Cridlebaugh, then across 
what is now the Sweet property, then onto what is now the Hoch property, where it tied into the 
lower road. 16 The upper road as described by Cridlebaugh, i.e. from Stagecoach Road to the 
Hoch property, was subsequently designated by Nez Perce County as Black Bear Bend. 17 
Cridlebaugh further testified that the lower road was primarily a four-wheeler trail when he 
12 Plaintiffs' Exhibits 105, 106, and 107. 
13 The Court found that, despite a contrary intent by Jack Cridlebaugh, the language in the Hoch warranty deed 
conveyed to Hocbs easement rights in both the upper and lower roads. 
14 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 6-7. 
15 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 8. 
16 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at pp 9-10. 
17 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10-1 shows Black Bear Bend as a loop. However, the map appears to either be inaccurate or to 
have omissions as it does not indicate the location of Buckboard Lane or the road referred to by the parties as the 
lower road. 
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purchased the property, but that the upper road was passable by way of pickup truck. 18 
However, prior to selling any of the property, Cridlebaugh had work done on the roads. The 
Sweets further improved the upper road, predominantly following the existing route that had 
always provided access. 
The parties have not disputed the route of the upper road and, therefore, there is little 
more the Court can add as to route. As for scope, the easement right on the upper road is defined 
in the Hoch warranty deed as limited to ingress and egress. 
(B) THE VANCE PORTION OF BUCKBOARD LANE 
In dispute is whether Plaintiffs Hoch received easement rights in that portion of 
Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property. The evidence on this issue is less than clear. 
Jack Cridlebaugh, when asked to describe the upper road, stated: 
It was just a dirt road. Nobody graveled it or anything. It traveled from, well, 
from my property through Sweets, and originally the road made a loop before I 
bought it. It came up Buckboard Lane and crossed in a westerly direction in 
front ofVances, made a loop out toward the Hochs' property and then went right 
back up this way, out to my ten acres. 
Jack Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p. 19. 
Cridlebaugh' s description of the upper road, as stated in his deposition at page 19 is, 
however, in conflict with other of his testimony. In his deposition, Cridlebaugh stated he did not 
have easement rights on Buckboard Lane. When asked if there were any roadways in place that 
provided access to the Hoch, Sweet, or Vance properties during the time period of 1997 to 2001, 
Cridlebaugh stated, "No. The only three accesses were the upper road, this Buckboard Lane and 
this lower road. I didn't have access over Buckboard Lane."19 Therefore, at the time 
Cridlebaugh sold V ances their property, the upper road could not have come up Buckboard Lane 
18 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p 11. 
19 Cridlebaugh Depo. Tr. at p. 20 [emphasis added]. 
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and made a loop back across V ances', Hochs', and Sweets properties and onto the ten acres 
currently owned by Cridlebaugh. A careful reading of Cridlebaugh's testimony reveals his 
statement was that the described loop existed before he bought the property. There is, however, 
no evidence before the Court that suggests Cridlebaugh, who had no easement right on the 
portion of Buckboard Lane that currently crosses the McKenna property, maintained or utilized 
the portion of Buckboard Lane that crosses the Vance property. Therefore, the Court must 
determine if the Vance portion of Buckboard Lane was a "roadway" at the time Cridlebaugh 
conveyed his property to the V ances and whether it was considered part of the upper road. 
Defendant's Exhibit 200 is a 1998 aerial photo of those portions of the Cridlebaugh 
ninety acres that were eventually sold to Vance, Sweet, and Hoch. The photo clearly appears to 
depict what came to be known as Buckboard Lane, showing it from the point it leaves 
Stagecoach Road, passing across the McKenna property and across the Vance property, onto the 
Hoch property where it tied into the intersection of the upper and lower roads. Defendant Vance 
testified he purchased his property from Cridlebaugh in October 2000, approximately two years 
after the 1998 aerial photo was taken. The only ingress/egress access Vance received was an 
easement right on the lower road, as Cridlebaugh did not have an easement right on Buckboard 
Lane where it crosses the McKenna property. After purchasing his property, Vance and 
McKenna entered into a reciprocal easement agreement that gave Vance easement rights on the 
McKenna portion of Buckboard Lane. 
Vance testified he had walked the area of his property that is now Buckboard Lane before 
and after purchasing his property and stated it appeared to be an old skidder trail that had ruts in 
it, indicating it had been traveled at some point. After obtaining easement rights from the 
9 
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McKennas, Vance testified he hired an individual to build Buckboard Lane so that he would 
have better access to and from Stagecoach Road. 
The Court finds the evidence shows the portion of Buckboard Lane that runs upon the 
Vance property was an existing road at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed property to the V ances 
and clearly appears on the 1998 aerial photograph20 as an extension of the upper road. As a 
result, it was subject to the reservation of easement rights retained by Cridlebaugh in the Vance 
Warranty Deed, and was an easement right conveyed to the Hochs by incorporation of that 
easement right in the Warranty Deed from Cridlebaugh to Hoch. However, the Hochs need to be 
cognizant of the limits of their easement right on Buckboard Lane. It does not include any 
portion of Buckboard Lane not on the Vance property. Therefore, it does not convey to Hochs 
any right in that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the McKenna property and does not 
provide Hochs access to Stagecoach Road by means of Buckboard Lane. The Hochs have no 
easement right in that portion of Buckboard Lane that runs across the McKenna property. Jack 
Cridlebaugh at no time had an easement right on the McKenna portion of Buckboard Lane and, 
therefore, he could not convey to the Hochs that which he did not have. 
(C) RELOCATION OF UPPER ROAD PURSUANT TO I.C.§ 55-313 
Defendants Sweet seek a declaratory judgment from the Court allowing them to relocate 
the portion of the upper road that traverses their property. The proposed route of the relocation 
has been identified and roughed-in on the ground by a bulldozer, but no graveling, drainage, or 
other improvements have been made to the proposed new road. Idaho Code provides: 
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication, 
has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the 
person or persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at 
their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but 
20 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #7. 
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such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle 
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such 
access. 
Idaho Code § 55-313. 
At trial, the Court heard testimony from Raymond Flowers, a registered Professional 
Engineer with over fifty-five years of road engineering experience. Mr. Flowers was hired by 
Plaintiffs Hoch to inspect the proposed new road21 and then provide a written report22 regarding 
his inspection and expert opinion as to the feasibility of the proposed new road. Mr. Flowers 
testified it was his opinion the proposed road increased the travel distance to the Hoch property 
by approximately 1900 feet over the current route, the proposed route includes grades of 10% to 
15%, the road width will accommodate only a single vehicle and has no turnouts or other means 
to allow more than one vehicle to travel on the roadway, the road would require significant 
sloping, berm removal and other drainage features before all-weather access would be possible, 
and the road surface will be impassable during wet or snowy weather conditions unless 
considerable amounts of rock and gravel are placed on the roadway. Defendants Sweet offered 
no expert testimony to dispute the opinion of Mr. Flowers, offering instead their lay opinion that 
the road is a travelable roadway. 
The Court finds the proposed relocation of that section of the upper road that traverses 
the Sweet property would cause injury to Plaintiffs Hoch. The proposed route nearly triples the 
distance of the Sweet portion of the road and includes two steep grades of 10% or greater. The 
increased distance and the steep grades would significantly add to the cost of maintaining the 
road, would make the road impassable by ordinary vehicles except under the most ideal weather 
and surface conditions, creates safety risks as it is only wide enough for a single vehicle, and the 
21 Plaintiffs' Exhibits 26 through 26-44 depict the proposed new road. 
22 Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28. 
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ability to provide year around access is questionable. Therefore, the Court finds Defendant 
Sweets are enjoined from relocating the portion of roadway at issue to the proposed location. 
(D) TRESPASS CLAIMS/COUNTERCLAIMS 
After Plaintiffs Hoch rested their case in chief, Defendants Sweet and Vance moved for a 
directed verdict on Hochs' claims for trespass. The Court took the motion under advisement and 
now enters its ruling along with an analysis of the counterclaim for trespass asserted by 
Defendants Vance. 
Plaintiffs Hoch alleged Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance have entered onto 
Plaintiffs property without permission, thus committing trespass. In particular, Plaintiffs Hoch 
allege Defendant Audrey Sweet entered onto the Hoch property and aggressively approached 
John Hoch while waiving papers at him. Defendants Sweet and Vance both assert counterclaims 
contending Plaintiffs Hoch have entered onto each of their respective properties without 
permission, thus committing trespass. In particular, Defendants Sweet allege Plaintiffs Hoch, 
their agents or employees, without the permission of the Sweets, deposited rock onto the Sweet 
property in July 2004 causing damage to the Sweet property. Defendants Vance assert Plaintiffs 
Hoch have committed trespass by allowing construction and other types of debris to go onto the 
Vance property23 . 
The Court finds there has been no trespass by the Defendants upon Plaintiffs' property. 
The Court was presented with no evidence that Plaintiffs have no-trespassing signs marking their 
property, no evidence that Plaintiffs informed the Defendants they were not allowed onto their 
property, and presented no evidence Plaintiffs were damaged by the Defendants going onto their 
23 This claim is limited to any trespass that occurred after July 2, 2009. See Memorandum Decision and Order 
entered by Judge Bradbury on October 25, 2010 regarding claims that survived the mediation agreement between 
Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants Vance. 
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property. To the contrary, the clear evidence is that initially Plaintiffs Hoch and Defendants 
Sweet and Vance considered each other friends, engaging in social activities together. While the 
relationships appear to have soured, the Court was presented with no evidence that the 
relationships had become so hostile that one party had forbidden the other from entering upon 
their property in order to have a conversation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against the 
Defendants for trespass are without merit. 
Defendants Sweet and Vance both assert trespass claims against Plaintiffs for allowing 
excavation and construction debris to go upon Defendants' properties. As for Defendants 
Sweet's claim that Plaintiffs allowed rock debris to be placed on Sweet's property, the Court 
finds Plaintiffs must remove any rock from the Sweet's property that is there as a result of it 
being moved from Plaintiffs' property to Defendants Sweet's property during excavation on the 
Hoch property. This will require Defendants Sweet allow Plaintiffs access to Sweet's property. 
The same is true of any construction or other debris that Plaintiffs Hoch have allowed to travel 
onto Defendants Vance's property. Plaintiffs Hoch are responsible for removing all of their 
debris from the Vance's property. However, this will also require the cooperation of the parties 
and permission from the Vance's for the Hochs or their agents to go onto the Vance property to 
complete the task of cleaning up the debris. If Defendants Sweet or Defendants Vance are 
unable or unwilling to cooperate in the removal of the Hochs' rock and debris from their 
respective properties, then the Hochs will be relieved of their responsibility to remove the items 
of trespass. 
(E) PLAINTIFFS' ASSAULT CLAIM 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts Audrey Sweet committed an assault upon John 
Hoch by aggressively approaching him and making physical threats, causing John Hoch to fear 
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he was at risk of imminent hann. Plaintiffs, however, presented no evidence Audrey Sweet at 
any time threatened John Hoch and presented no evidence that John Hoch was fearful on the day 
Audrey Sweet came to his Waha home to discuss his use of the upper road. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' claim for assault must be dismissed. 
(F) PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIM 
Plaintiffs allege Defendants Sweet and Vance interfered with the Hochs reasonable use 
and comfortable enjoyment of their property by placing barriers in the easement roadway, thus 
making the road impassable or requiring the Hochs to remove the barriers in order to utilize the 
easement to reach their property. Plaintiffs Hoch seek relief by way of an injunction, damages, 
or abatement. 
The nuisance claim against Defendants Vance involved efforts by the Vances to block the 
Hochs' use of Buckboard Lane where it traverses the Vances' property. While the Court found 
the warranty deed to Plaintiffs Hoch conveyed an easement right upon that portion of Buckboard 
Lane that traverses the Vance property, the Court also found the easement right upon the Vance 
portion of Buckboard Lane is limited in scope and does not provide ingress and egress access for 
the Hochs, as they have no easement right upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the 
McKenna property and meets the public roadway known as Stagecoach Road. 
The nuisance complained of by the Hochs as against the Vances was enjoined by the 
Court in June 2010. During trial, Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they were damaged as a 
result of being prevented from exercising their easement right upon the Vance portion of 
Buckboard Lane, which does not provide Plaintiffs ingress and egress to their property. 
Therefore, the appropriate relief is to permanently enjoin Defendants Vance from blocking the 
roadway in a manner that prevents Plaintiffs from exercising their easement right. However, 
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contrary to arguments put forth by Plaintiffs at trial, the Court does not find the placement of a 
gate across any of the roadways upon which Plaintiffs have an easement right to be a barrier or 
obstruction to Plaintiffs' easement right, so long as Plaintiffs have the ability to pass through any 
gate.24 As was stated by Idaho's Court of Appeals, "[L]imiting access to the easement to those 
with use rights is sensible and benefits both parties". Boydstun Beach Association v. Allen, 111 
Idaho 370, 378, 723 P.2d 914 (1986). This is especially true in the parties' situation where their 
homes are in a very rural area used by recreationalists, hunters, and people looking for firewood. 
Plaintiffs have also asserted Defendants Sweet and Vance have placed barriers on the 
upper road in order to prevent the Hochs use of the road. Any impediment to Plaintiffs use of the 
upper road was enjoined by the Court in June 2010 and Plaintiffs presented no evidence that any 
such activity has occurred since that time. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend Defendants efforts to 
prevent them from using the upper road have damaged Plaintiffs ability to complete construction 
on the home, and that it has cost them lost wages in dealing with the problem. 
Plaintiffs are seeking a variety of monetary damages. First, Plaintiffs seek damages for 
thirty months of mortgage payments on their Lewiston home, contending they had to make two 
mortgage payments for a longer period than anticipated because of construction delays caused by 
road barriers. The Court finds Plaintiffs' claim for mortgage damages too speculative. Plaintiffs 
never engaged the services of a real estate agent, never placed their Lewiston home on the 
market through an agent or by any other method, presented no evidence regarding the 
marketability of the home or the likelihood of the home selling in the current housing market. 
Plaintiff John Hoch testified they recently had the W aha home on the market for a short period 
but had no interested buyers. The Court is also not persuaded that the sole delay in finishing 
24 This will require that all parties with easement rights on a roadway be provided a key or the combination to any 
lock that is placed on a gate. 
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construction of Plaintiffs' W aha home was the few incidents of road barriers. Plaintiff John 
Hoch testified he knew he had easement rights on the lower road and had used the lower road on 
a number of occasions to access his property. Plaintiffs could have used the lower road for 
access but chose not to, asserting it was longer and not as good a road. Nevertheless, nothing 
prevented Plaintiffs from improving and utilizing the lower road in order to move construction of 
their home forward. Additionally, with the exception of possibly one time, Plaintiffs or their 
contractors were able to go around or remove the road barriers so as to reach their property. The 
Defendants have not blocked the roadway since being enjoined from doing so by the Count in 
June 2009, yet construction of Plaintiffs' Waha home remains unfinished. The evidence does not 
establish that the construction delays resulted from the actions taken by the Defendants prior to 
June 2009. 
Next, Plaintiffs contend they suffered lost wages when John Hoch had to take time away 
from work to deal with issues raised by the dispute over road access. However, Plaintiffs 
presented no evidence supporting the claim, such as the number of appointments cancelled as a 
direct result of the road issues and the average income per appointment. Rather, Plaintiffs 
simply offered the Court a speculative number of 1.5 days lost at a value of $1,500.00 per day. 
The Court finds the claimed damages too speculative and without sufficient evidence to directly 
relate the loss to road issues. 
Plaintiffs also seek damages for the cost of rock placed on the upper road and snow 
removal costs for the upper and the lower road. The law in Idaho regarding the duty to maintain 
an easement road is well established. 
The owner of a servient estate has no duty to maintain the easement. Gibbens v. 
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 640, 570 P.2d 870, 877 (1977); Coulsen v. Aberdeen-
Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 630, 277 P. 542, 546 (1929). The duty of 
maintaining the easement rests with the easement owner (i.e., dominant estate), 
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even when the servient landowner uses the easement. Sellers v. Powell, 120 Idaho 
250, 251, 815 P.2d 448, 449 (1991). That duty requires the easement owner 
maintain, repair, and protect the easement so as not to create an additional burden 
on the servient estate or an interference that would damage the land, such as 
flooding of the servient estate. Conley, 133 Idaho at 271, 985 P.2d at 1133; 
Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 640, 570 P.2d at 877; Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir 
District# 2, 97 Idaho 634, 636, 550 P.2d 137, 139 (1976); Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. 
Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 738, 285 P. 474, 475 (1930). 
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455-456, 95 P.3d 69 (2004). 
Costs incurred by Plaintiffs to clear snow, repair, and maintain roads on which they hold 
easements rights are the responsibility of Plaintiffs, not the responsibility of the servient 
landowners. 
(G) DEFENDANTS SWEET COUNTERCLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Defendants Sweet, who hold an easement right in the upper road, have made substantial 
improvements to the road from the point it enters the Sweet property to where it accesses their 
home. Defendants Sweet now argue that if Plaintiffs Hoch are found to have an easement right 
on the upper road, they will be unjustly enriched by the improvements made by the Sweets at 
their expense on the portion of the road that traverses the Sweet property. Defendants Sweet 
correctly note that Plaintiffs Hoch will benefit from the improvements made by the Sweets. 
However, the law does not support Defendants claim for unjust enrichment. 
When a servient estate owner seeks contribution they must show the dominant 
estate owner's maintenance created an additional burden or an interference that 
would damage the servient estate. Id. 
[A]bsent a showing that the easement owners maintenance' of the 
easement created an additional burden or interference with the servient 
estate, the servient estate cannot dictate the standard by which the 
easement should be maintained, expend funds to maintain it to the level 
desired by the servient estate and then seek reimbursement for those 
expenditures and contribution for future expenditures from the easement 
owners. 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 66, 190 P.3d 876 (2008). 
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Defendants Sweet presented the Court with no evidence showing the improvements they 
made to the upper road were the result of Plaintiffs' easement right creating an additional burden 
or an interference that would damage the servient estate. Nor is it likely Defendants Sweet could 
have made such a showing as the improvements they made to the road were done prior to the 
Court ruling Plaintiffs Hoch hold an easement right in the upper road. 
(H) BREACH OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 
Plaintiffs Hoch assert Defendants V ance25 have breached certain of the covenants that are 
part of each of the parties' warranty deeds by failing to maintain their property in a clean and 
attractive manner and by acting in a manner that has been noxious, illegal or offensive so as to 
interfere with Plaintiffs' quiet enjoyment of their property. The warranty deeds conveying 
property to the V ances, Sweets and Hochs contain the following pertinent restrictive covenants: 
1. No noxious, illegal or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any parcel, 
nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may become a nuisance 
to the neighborhood or in any way materially interfere with the quiet 
enjoyment of each of the respective parcel owners. 
2. Each parcel shall be kept in a clean and attractive manner. 
3. Outbuildings, such as barns, shops or free-standing garages, shall be similar in 
design to and compliment the structure constructed on the parcel. 
Plaintiffs contend Defendants Vance have violated the above portions of the restrictive 
covenants by placing a brush pile and equipment on the Vance property within view of the Hoch 
home and by failing to tear dovm an old shed that is visible from the Hoch property. Defendant 
Vance testified the shed at issue was on the property when he purchased it, that the brush pile 
25 Defendant Vances' claim is limited to any breach that occurred after the mediation agreement entered into by the 
parties on July 2, 2010. See Judge Bradbury's Memorandum Decision and Order entered October 25, 2010. 
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was the result of fire mitigation work being done in agreement with Nez Perce County26 and that 
he parks his equipment in the area as it is the only area on his property that is sufficiently flat for 
such a purpose. Plaintiff Hoch in his testimony acknowledged the old shed was on the Vance 
property prior to the V ances' purchase of the property and that the brush pile was burned once 
weather conditions allowed. The Court does not find Defendants Vance in breach of the 
restrictive covenants. Efforts to mitigate potential fire hazards are a benefit, not only to the 
V ances, but also to those living in the area. The Court is also not persuaded that parking 
equipment on one of the few flat areas of the Vances property violates the restrictive covenants, 
nor does leaving a prior structure in place. 
Finally, the Vances also assert a claim against Plaintiffs Hoch for violations of the 
restrictive covenants by allowing litter and construction debris to accumulate on the Hoch 
property. While the term "clean and attractive" as used in the restrictive covenants is vague, it is 
also relative to the surrounding area. The Court cannot characterize the condition of the area 
around the under-construction Hoch home as clean and attractive. However, the unkempt but 
presumably temporary condition appears to damage only the Hochs, as the debris is not visible 
from the Vance home or from the majority of the Vance property, but is clearly visible to any 
potential buyer viewing the Hoch property. Therefore, while the present condition around the 
Hoch home appears to violate the "clean and attractive" language in the restrictive covenants, 
there is no evidence the V ances have been damaged by the condition. 
26 Defendants Exhibit #204. 
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Cl) ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Each party in his pleadings seeks an award of attorney fees and costs. The Court finds 
each party shall be responsible for his own attorney fees and costs, as each of the parties asserted 
meritorious claims and each prevailed in part. 
ORDER 
The route and scope of the upper road is as the roadway currently exists from the point 
that it departs Stagecoach Road to the point that it reaches the Hoch property. 
The warranty deed from Cridlebaugh to Hochs conveyed an easement right on that 
portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property, but is limited to that portion of the 
roadway and does not extend beyond the Vance property onto that portion that traverses the 
Mc Kenna property. 
Defendants Sweet's request for a declaratory judgment allowing them to move that 
portion of the upper road that traverses their property is denied. 
Plaintiffs' claims for trespass against Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are 
dismissed. 
Plaintiffs are ordered to remove the excavation rock that was taken from Plaintiffs' 
property and deposited upon Defendants Sweet's property if they can obtain the cooperation of 
Defendants Sweet. 
Plaintiffs are ordered to remove the construction and other debris that has traveled from 
Plaintiffs' property onto Defendants Vance's property if they can obtain the cooperation of 
Defendants Vance. 
Plaintiffs' claim for assault against Defendants Sweets is hereby dismissed. 
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Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are hereby permanently enjoined from 
preventing, or attempting to prevent, Plaintiffs exercise of their easement rights upon the upper 
road and upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that traverses the Vance property. 
Defendants Sweet's counterclaim for unjust enrichment is hereby dismissed. 
Plaintiffs claim for breach of covenants against Defendants Vance is hereby dismissed. 
Defendants Vance are hereby ordered to remove their lis pendens filing against Plaintiffs 
Roch's property. 
Defendants Vance's claim against Plaintiffs for breach of covenants is hereby dismissed. 
Each parties' claim for attorney fees and costs is hereby denied. 
°'7 Dated this _ day of February 2012. -+--, -
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in the above entitled action on December 23, 2009, by the Honorable John Bradbury, and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered in the above entitled action on February 9, 
2012, by the Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brodie, presiding. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) 
I.AR. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert 
in the appeal include the following: 
(a) 
(b) 
Did the District Court error in granting Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment? 
Did the District Court error in determining that "Buckboard Lane" was an 
"existing roadway" at the time Jack Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to the 
Appellants? 
( c) Did the District Court error in denying Appellants' motion in limine? 
(d) Did the District Court error in admitting Jack Cridlebaugh's deposition into 
evidence? 





A reporter's transcript is requested. 
The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Rule 25( c) I.AR. of the trial held on December 12, 13, and 14, 
2011 in both l).ard copy and electronic format. 
The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
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10/21/2009 Plf s Motion for Summary Judgment 
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10/2 l /2009 Memorandum in Support of Plf s Motion for Summary Judgment 
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of Jake Sweet and Becky Vance 
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Summary Judgment and Defs' Vance's Memo in Opposition to Motion for 
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12/14/2011 Exhibit 109, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
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below: 
Name and Address: 
Linda Carlton 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for 
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript. 
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(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SE ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROL HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and 















CASE NO. CV08-02272 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on December 12, 13, and 14, 2011. 
Plaintiffs Hoch were represented by attorneys Theodore 0. Creason and Samuel T. Creason. 
Defendants Sweet were represented by attorney Edwin L. Litteneker. Defendants Vance were 
represented by attorney W. Jeremy Carr. The Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order on February 9, 2012. 
Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce 
County, to-wit: The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Hoch v. Sweet & Vance 
Final Judgment 
Plaintiffs John and Carole Hoch are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce 
County, to-wit: The West half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
Defendants Jake and Audrey Sweet are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce 
County, to-wit: The Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, Township 33 
North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
Defendants Rob and Becky Vance are the owners of real property located in Nez Perce 
County, to-wit: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 West of the Boise Meridian, Official Records ofNez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
THEREFORE, IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT THAT: 
(1) The route and scope of the road commonly referred to as the 'upper road' is 
as the roadway currently exists from the point that it departs Stagecoach 
Road to the point that it reaches the Hoch property. 
(2) Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, by way of the warranty deed 
from Criddlebaugh to Hoch, hold an easement for ingress and egress over 
the road commonly known as the 'upper road', which crosses over a portion 
of the real property owned by Defendants Jake Sweet and Audrey Sweet and 
a portion of the real property owned by Rob Vance and Becky Vance. 
(3) Plaintiffs John M. Hoch and Carole D. Hoch, by way of the warranty deed 
from Criddlebaugh to Hoch, hold an easement over a portion of Buckboard 
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Lane, the easement being only upon that portion of Buckboard Lane that 
traverses the real property owned by Rob Vance and Becky Vance. 
( 4) Defendant Sweets' request for a declaratory judgment allowing them to 
move that portion of the upper road that traverses their property is denied. 
(5) Plaintiffs' claims for trespass against Defendants Sweet and Defendants 
Vance are dismissed. 
(6) Plaintiffs Hoch are ordered to remove the excavation rock that was taken 
from Plaintiffs' property and deposited upon Defendants Sweet's property if 
they can obtain the cooperation of Defendants Sweet. 
(7) Plaintiffs Hoch are ordered to remove the construction and other debris that 
has traveled from Plaintiffs' property onto Defendants Vance's property if 
they can obtain the cooperation of Defendants Vance. 
(8) Plaintiffs' claim for assault against Defendants Sweets is hereby dismissed. 
(9) Defendants Sweet and Defendants Vance are hereby permanently enjoined 
from preventing, or attempting to prevent, Plaintiffs exercise of their 
easement rights upon the upper road and upon that portion of Buckboard 
Lane that traverses the Vance property. 
(10) Defendants Sweet's counterclaim for unjust enrichment is hereby dismissed. 
(11) Plaintiffs claim for breach of covenants against Defendants Vance is hereby 
dismissed. 
(12) Defendants Vance are hereby ordered to remove their lis pendens filing 
against Plaintiffs Roch's property. 
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(13) Defendants Vance's claim against Plaintiffs for breach of covenants is 
hereby dismissed. 
(14) The claim for attorney fees and costs sought by each and every party is 
hereby denied. 
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Dated this-+- day of July 2012. 
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JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, ) Case No. CV 2008-02272 
husband and wife, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) 
) Fee Category: L 
vs. ) Fee Amount: $101.00 
) 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, ) 
husband and wife; ROB VANCE and BECKY ) 
VANCE, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. 
HOCH, HUSBAl'JD AND \\11FE, AND THEIR ATTORNEY, THEADORE 0. 
CREASON, 1219 Idaho Street, P.O. Drawer 835, Lewiston, Idaho 83501; 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, husband and 
wife, appeal against the above-named Respondents, JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, 
husband and wife, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order entered 
in the above entitled action on December 23, 2009, by the Honorable John Bradbury, and the 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered in the above entitled action on February 9, 
2012, by the Honorable Judge JeffM. Brudie, presiding, and the Final Judgment entered on July 9, 
2012, by the Honorable Judge Jeff M. Brudie. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l) 
I.AR. 
A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert 





Did the District Court error in granting Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment? 
Did the District Court error in determining that "Buckboard Lane" was an 
"existing roadway" at the time Jack Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to the 
Appellants? 
Did the District Court error in denying Appellants' motion in limine? 
Did the District Court error in admitting Jack Cridlebaugh's deposition into 
evidence? 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
A reporter's transcript has been requested and the estimated fee has been 
paid. 
The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript 
as defined in Rule 25( c) I.AR. of the trial held on December 12, 13, and 14, 
2011 in both hard copy and electronic format. 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
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Summary Judgment 
11123/2009 Def's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
11/23/2009 Affidavit of Becky Vance in Support of Memo in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
1 l /25/2009 Plf s Motion to Exclude Objectionable Testimony Submitted by the Affidavits 
of Jake Sweet and Becky Vance 
11/25/2009 Plfs Reply to Def's Jake and Autrey Sweet's Reply Memo to Plfs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Defs' Vance's Memo in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
12/14/2011 Exhibit 109, Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
12/14/2011 Exhibit 108, Deposition of Jack Cridlebaugh 
7. The Appellants request the following documents, charges, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted into 
evidence. 
8. I certify: 
(a) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Name and Address: 
Linda Carlton 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 



























(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees for 
preparation of the designated reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this,Jlffrctay of J~ly, 2012. 
CLARKan~FE~ 
By:V~ v-· 
w. Jeremy c~l,"a member clf'the firm. 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants 
_ Rob and Becky Vance 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisJsftcray of July, 2012, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the following: 
Theodore 0. Creason ~' 
-U.S. Mail 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Mcintosh Hand Delivered 
PO Drawer 835 D Overnight Mail 
Lewiston, ID 83501 D Telecopy 
Edwin L. Litteneker D -- U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law ~ Hand Delivered 
PO Box 321 D Overnight Mail 
Lewiston, ID 83501 D Telecopy 
Linda Carlton yu.S.Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivered 
PO Box 896 D Overnight Mail 
Lewiston, ID 83501 D Telecopy 
1J-By: / 
' /( W. Jeremy Carr, Attorneys f0 
Rob and Becky Vance 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LAW OFFICES OF 
4 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
And 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39788 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
Nez Perce County, do hereby certify that the following is the 
list of the exhibits offered or admitted and which have been 
lodged with the Supreme Court or retained as indicated: 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
seal of the Court this /;J.- day of September 2012. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
By 
Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Date: 9/12/2012 Second ial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 09:14 AM Exhibit Summary 
Page 1 of 6 Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return Date 
1 Defendants Sweet Exhibit A -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph--showing berm across 
road (photo taken 11-13-08) 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L Admitted: 6-22-10 
2 Defendants Sweet Exhibit B -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph -- showing machinery 
blocking road (photo taken 9-6-08) 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L -- Admitted: 6-22-1 O 
3 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1 -- Large arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph submitted as an 
illustrative Exhibit at the 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 otsc/contempt hearing in front of 
Judge Bradbury on 6-22-1 O --
Admitted again at Court Trial: 
12-12-11 
4 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #2 -- Arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
photograph showing properties 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 
5 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3-- Arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing Hoch, Sweet, 
Vance, McKenna & Cridlebaugh 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 properties "2009" -- Admitted: 
12-12-11 Court Trial 
6 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #4 -- Arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing Hoch, Sweet, 
Vance, McKenna & Cridlebaugh 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 properties "2007" Admitted: 
12-12-11 Court Trial 
7 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #4A -- (A copy of Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Plaintiffs' exhibit #4 that Mr. Hoch 
used a yellow highlighter on the 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 stand to depict where the shot 
rock was placed) Admitted: 
12-12-11 Court Trial 
8 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5-- Arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph of area with houses 
and roads depicted "2007" 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 
9 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5A --(A copy of Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Plaintiffs' exhibit #5--Mr. 
Litteneker drew on impovement 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 lines on roads during witness Mr. 
Flowers' testimony) Admitted: 
12-13-11 Court Trial 
10 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #6 -- Arial photo Admitted Exhibit Vault 
area (Sweet House is there, Hoch 
and Vance houses have not been 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 built yet) "2004" Admitted: 
12-12-11 Court Trial 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS l}~I 
Date: 9.112/2012 Second cial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 09:14AM Exhibit Summary 
Page 2 of 6 Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return Date 
11 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #6-A --(A copy of Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Plaintiffs exhibit #6 that Mr. 
Flowers drew on access roads 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 and exhibit 24 road and exhibit 25 
road while a witness on the stand) 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
12 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #7 -- Arial Admitted Exhibit Vault 
photograph of area before any 
houses were built "1998" 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
13 Plaintiffs; Exhibit #8 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Topographical Map of Area 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 
14 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #9 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Topographical Map of Area 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 
15 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #10 -- Nez Perce Admitted Exhibit Vault 
County Idaho 2004 Rural Street 
Atals 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
16 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #10-1 -- Offered Exhibit Vault 
Township Map of Area with Street 
Names 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
17 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #11 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing 
Cridlebaugh/Hoch road sign 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 
18 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #12 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing close-up 
view of Cridlebaugh/Hoch road sig1 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
19 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #13 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph of road looking SW 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 
20 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #14 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph facing East --
Bulldozer on Section of Property 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 between Hoch/Sweet property 
Admitted: 12-12-11 
21 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #15 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing position of 
bulldozer near Sweet's property. 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Photographer facing South 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
22 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #16 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing white 
pick-up, trailer and bulldozer in roa 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 4~~ 
Date: S.'12/2012 Second cial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 09:14AM Exhibit Summary 
Page 3 of 6 Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return Date 
23 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #17 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing newly 
surveyed property line, berm and 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 red stake 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
24 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #18 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing road near 
Hoch's home 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
25 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #19-- Photograph Admitted Exhibit Vault 
showing road near Hoch home. 
Shows shed, pile of wood and 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 trailer 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
26 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #20 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing road near 
Hoch home looking west. Shows 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 trailer and wood piles 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
27 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #21 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing showing 
same scene as Plaintiffs' exhibit 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 #20 only a close-up view of trailer 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
28 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #22 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing trailer and 
small storage shed that was on 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Cridlebaugh property and is now 
on Vance property 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
29 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #23 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing two pieces of 
equipment (plow and trailer) in 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 closer detail 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
30 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #24 (a collective Admitted Exhibit Vault 
exhibit including #24-1 - #24-10) 
Photographs 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
31 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #25 (a collective Admitted Exhibit Vault 
exhibit including #25-1 - #25-7) 
Photographs 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
32 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #26 (a collective Admitted Exhibit Vault 
exhibit including #26, #26-1 -
#26-44) Photographs showing 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 new road (trail) 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
33 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #27 -- Raymond Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Neal Flowers P.E. Curriculum VitaE 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 
~~ CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Date: 9/12/2012 Second cial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 09: 14 AM Exhibit Summary 
Page 4 of 6 Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return Date 
34 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #28 -- Report of Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Raymond Neal Flowers, Civil 
Engineer 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
35 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #29 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph showing what Giese 
encountered when came to work 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 at Hoch property. Dozer blocking 
road 
Admitted: 12-12-11 Court trial 
36 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #104 -- Purchase Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Agreement (between Jack 
Cridlebaugh and Rob Vance and 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Becky Vance 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
37 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105 -- Warranty Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Deed dated 10-12-00 Cridlebaugh 
to Vance 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
38 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106 -- Warranty Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Deed dated 10-10-01 Cridlebaugh 
to Sweet 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 Court Trial 
39 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107 -- Warranty Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Deed dated 3-26-02 Cridlebaugh 
to Hoch 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Admitted: 12-12-11 
40 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #108 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Designated Testimony, Deposition 
of Jack Cridlebaugh Taken on 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 4-15-09 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
41 Plaintiffs' Exhibit #109 -- Sealed Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Transcript of Motion to Show 
Cause Hearing on 6-22-10 
Assigned to: Creason, Theodore 0 Honorable John Bradbury Presidin• 
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial 
42 Defendants' Vance Exhibit #200 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
"1998" Arial Photograph 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy 
43 Defendants' Vance Exhibit #200A Admitted Exhibit Vault 
-- a copy of Defendants' exhibit 
#200 where witness Mr. Vance 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy drew on exhibit designating lower 
road in orange & East-West Road 
in yellow at Court Trial 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
44 Defendants Vance Exhibit #201 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
"2004" Arial Photograph 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy ~~i 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Date: 9/12/2012 Second cial District Court - Nez Perce County User: DEANNA 
Time: 09:14 AM Exhibit Summary 
Page 5 of 6 Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Number Description Result Property Item Number Date Return Date 
45 Defendants Vance Exhibit #202 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
"2007'' Arial Photograph 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy 
46 Defendants Vance Exhibit #202-A Admitted Exhibit Vault 
-- a copy of Defendants Vance 
exhibit #202 where Mr. Vance 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy drew Buckboard Lane at Court 
Trial 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
47 Defendants Vance Exhibit #203 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Record of Survey Section 22, 
Township 33 North, Range 4 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy West, Boise Meridian, Nez Perce 
County, Idaho 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
48 Defendants Vance Exhibit #204 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Survivable Space Plan -- Rob 
Vance Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
49 Defendants Vance Exhibit #205 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Photograph of Vance Property 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy 
50 Defendants Vance Exhibit #206 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Series of (3) Photographs marked 
A - C in lower right corner 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy Vance/Hoch property line 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
51 Defendants Vance Exhibit #207 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Series of (4) photographs marked 
A - D in lower right corner 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
52 Defendants Vance Exhibit #208 D Admitted Exhibit Vault 
& #208 G - L -- Photographs 
showing construction debris on 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy Vance Property 2010 
Admitted: 12-13-11 -- Court Trial 
53 Defendants Vance Exhibit #209 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Series of (8) Photographs marked 
A - H in lower right corner 
Assigned to: Carr, William Jeremy Hoch property taken by Vance 
Admitted: 12-13-11 Court Trial 
54 Defendants Sweet Exhibit #58 -- Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Copy of Plaintiffs' exhibit #5 that 
Mr. Sweet drew on during Court 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L trial 
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial 
55 Defendants Sweet Exhibit #305-A Admitted Exhibit Vault 
- #305-H -- Series of Photographs 
of Current Foute used by parties 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L (upper road) they show various 
~~ locations on upper road P6iliiR\EfdFiQ;.MJ;'E1 CllOliifildlHBITS 
Date: 9.'12/2012 
Time: 09: 14 AM 
Page 6 of 6 
Second icial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Exhibit Summary 
Case: CV-2008-0002272 
John M Hoch, etal. vs. Jake Sweet, etal. 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Number Description 
56 Defendants Sweet Exhibit #310-A 
- #310-W -- Photographs of 
Proposed Route to be used by 
parties 
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial 
57 Defendants Sweet Exhibit #313-A 
-#313-F -Additional 
Photographs of damages to 
properties 
Admitted: 12-14-11 Court Trial 
58 Defendants Sweet Exhibit #310-X 
-- Photograph of Proposed route 
to be used by parties --
Admitted for demonstrative 
purposes only: 12-14-11 Court 
Trial 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
Storage Location 
Result Property Item Number 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Litteneker, Edwin L 
User: DEANNA 
Destroy 
Notification Destroy or 
Date Return Date 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
And 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39788 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound 
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, 
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-
Appeal, and additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
1. That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures offered 
or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled cause, if any, 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court with 
any Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record as required 
by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this /). day of September 2012. 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN M. HOCK and CAROLE D. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs Respondents, 
v. 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
And 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
Husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 39788 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript were delivered to W. 
Jeremy Carr, 1229 Main St., Lewiston, ID 83501 and Theodore 
Creason, 1219 Idaho St., Lewis~::rrr_ Id 83501 by Valley Messenger 
Service, this _!_l day of Se~er 2012. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my ~~and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this /1 day of S~mber 2012. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 
